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Abstract 
There are many apparent similarities between the current political and economic situations of France 
and Italy. The mainstream view is that at least part of the neo-liberal strategy could be a solution to 
the economic problems of both variants of the European model of capitalism. However, the 
difficulties met by the implementation of these strategies by Sarkozy and Berlusconi lead to believe 
that the success or failure of neo-liberalisation has less to do with its (lack of) macroeconomic merits 
than with the stability of the socio-political alliances that support it. In this respect, France and Italy 
are markedly different. This paper shows that even if the ‘hard core’ of the neoliberal social bloc is 
roughly the same in both countries, this core constitutes a minority of the electorate; a neoliberal 
strategy must therefore rely on an extended social coalition, which might not be similar between 
countries. The Great Recession revealed part of the structural characteristics that set both countries 
apart. The aim of this article is to show that the consideration of the different socio-political alliances 
found in each country can help to understand how Italy and France ended up on different economic 
trajectories. 
Keywords: institutions; model of capitalism; neoliberal reforms; political crisis 
JEL codes: P16; P51; B52 
 
Résumé 
Il y a beaucoup de similitudes entre les situations politiques et économiques actuelles de la France et 
de l'Italie. L'opinion dominante est que la stratégie néolibérale pourrait, au moins en partie, résoudre 
les problèmes économiques de ces deux variantes du modèle de capitalisme européen. Mais les 
difficultés rencontrées par la mise en œuvre de ces stratégies par Sarkozy et Berlusconi portent à 
croire que le succès ou l'échec du néo-libéralisme a moins à voir avec son (manque de) mérite macro-
économique qu’avec la stabilité des alliances socio-politiques qui le soutiennent. À cet égard, la 
France et l'Italie sont nettement différentes. Cet article montre que même si le « noyau dur » du bloc 
social néolibéral est similaire dans les deux pays, ce noyau constitue une minorité de l'électorat ; une 
stratégie néolibérale doit donc s'appuyer sur une coalition sociale élargie, qui pourrait ne pas être 
semblable d’un pays à l’autre. La Grande Récession a révélé une partie des caractéristiques 
structurelles qui distinguent les deux pays. Le but de cet article est de montrer que l'examen des 
différentes alliances socio-politiques dans chaque pays peut aider à comprendre comment l'Italie et 
la France ont abouti sur des trajectoires économiques différentes. 
Mots-clefs: crise politique ; institutions ; modèles de capitalisme ; réformes néolibérales 
JEL codes: P16; P51; B52 
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1. Introduction 
France and Italy are two interesting case studies of institutional change. Both countries are 
somewhat similar in terms of their economic institutions: they are variants of capitalism in Europe 
(Amable 2003), France being close to the Continental model and Italy close to the Mediterranean 
model, or were considered as examples of ‘state-led capitalism’ (Schmidt 2002). 
From the 1980s on, numerous institutional reforms have been undertaken in both countries: 
in the financial sector, the product markets, the labour market, the welfare system etc. The most 
common interpretation is that these reforms were a national response to exogenous economic 
changes affecting capitalism in general and taking place at the international level, including the 
process of economic globalization and European unification. However, according to this 
interpretation, the reforms, which are commonly presented as ‘necessary’, have met political 
obstacles in both countries. This explains why institutional change has not yet resulted in consistent 
and economically efficient systems. 
This interpretation is largely present in the business press. For example, analyzing the action 
of the centre-left Italian government in February 2007, The Economist noted that “[m]ore 
competition and less regulation are sorely needed in Italy”, and quoted a government minister to 
explain why the reforms were not implemented fast enough: for Emma Bonino, the Europe minister, 
“if we were Milton Friedman's [kind of] government, we'd do more. But we're not. This is a 
government that looks for compromise”.6 A year later, The Economist assessed in the following terms 
the prospects of the third Berlusconi government: “given the populist tendencies of the prime 
minister's alliance and the likelihood that coalition divisions will come to the fore, hopes for a radical 
change in economic policy that will dramatically improve Italy’s growth performance and fragile 
public accounts are likely to prove unfounded”.7 
A similar diagnosis was drawn for France. There, the obstacles to structural reforms would 
primarily be “[t]he fearsome power of the French street”.8 The Economist put great hopes in N. 
Sarkozy's ambitious structural reforms plan: “[Sarkozy] pledged to get France back to work, to scrap 
exorbitant public-sector privileges, to cut taxes and to set free a strangled labour market. […] Mr 
Sarkozy was admirably clear about his intentions, and he won an equally clear electoral mandate in 
May.” Following this, The Economist’s advice to Sarkozy was: “Don't give in”. However, because “Mr 
Sarkozy is by nature a deal-maker, a man disposed always to look for compromise”, the fear was that 
“in the confrontation that he now faces” he would back away from the promised reforms. 
The vision of a reform process made indispensable by the international economic constraints 
but which faces obstacles in the national political sphere is not only present in the mass media; it is 
also markedly dominant in academic research. For instance, for Simonazzi et al. (2008), “Italy must 
still make the macroeconomic adjustments required by participation in the EMU [European 
Monetary Unification] and the challenge of globalisation” but “the progress of reforms [...] has been 
hindered by lack of consensus within politically weak coalitions subject to the veto power of various 
interests” (Simonazzi et al. 2008: 1). Similarly, for Della Sala (2004) “Italy provides an interesting case 
study to examine the discussion about the persistence, adaptability or transformation of national 
models of capitalism in the face of external pressures” (Della Sala 2004: 1042, our emphasis). 
However, more than a genuine transformation of Italian capitalism one would face “an ongoing 
process of constant adaptation that does not affect the basic structures of the governing of the 
Italian economy” (Della Sala 2004: 1046), a “process of change without transformation” (Della Sala 
2004: 1049). The outcome of this reform process would not be an efficient and coherent model of 
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capitalism: “reforms have not tackled the structural weaknesses of the Italian model, namely its 
specialization pattern, the North-South divide, and the dualism in social protection” (Simonazzi et al. 
2008: 2), “Italy remains a form of dysfunctional state capitalism” (Della Sala 2004: 1054). 
The situation of France is usually considered in a somewhat less pessimistic way. By the early 
2000s, it was widely acknowledged that France was “no longer a statist political economy” 
(Culpepper 2006). The increase in competition entailed by the transformations in the international 
environment (globalization of firms’ activities, European economic integration…) had made it 
necessary to abandon the nation-centred ‘dirigiste’ model: “[i]n response to a more open European 
economy, France made its markets more competitive and increased its level of social protection at 
the same time” (Hall 2007: 56). But this new configuration is not without creating problems. “France 
has needed two sets of reforms—a first set of  reforms to get rid of dysfunctional dirigisme and a 
second set of reforms to address some of the problems stemming from the first set of reforms, from 
social anaesthesia measures” (Levy 2008: 429-430). France may have become a productive economy, 
but rates of growth remained low and unemployment high. A new set of reforms would be necessary 
to “move beyond the social anaesthesia model”; but efforts in this direction “have often failed in the 
face of popular resistance” (Levy 2008: 430).  Optimism should nevertheless prevail since over the 
past six decades, “adjustments have been anything but easy and have been accompanied by 
considerable protest and conflict, but somehow, the French have always managed to make the 
necessary changes” (Levy 2008: 430). Another reason for optimism is President Sarkozy and the 
conditions surrounding his election in 2007, on the promise of a ‘rupture’ if elected. However, “[i]t is 
by no means clear that Sarkozy is the man to turn France around. [...] The president seems to be 
vacillating between a genuine effort to modernise France and electorally motivated pay-offs to 
conservative constituents that weaken the economy and antagonise the unions.” But “sooner or 
later, French leaders, whether Sarkozy or an eventual successor, will bite the bullet and make the 
changes, however painful and unpopular, that are necessary to restore the country’s economic 
vitality” (Levy 2008: 432). 
There is therefore a broad consensus on the need to reform the French and Italian models of 
capitalism. This necessity is supposedly imposed by exogenous constraints related to the 
transformations affecting capitalism, globalization and European unification. Reforms are however 
allegedly thwarted by the weakness of the political coalitions that should carry them out. Such an 
interpretation is reinforced by the fact that in spite of the respective neoliberal programs on the 
basis of which Sarkozy was elected in 2007 and Berlusconi returned to power for the third time in 
2008, France and Italy carry out neoliberal reforms only partially and slowly. 
Another common characteristic of both countries is the existence of what will be defined as a 
political crisis (Palombarini, 2009). The crisis broke out in 1992 in Italy with a long series of judicial 
investigations that led to the disappearance of the main governing parties of that time. There were 
also vivid manifestations of a political crisis in France, such as the presence of the Front National (FN) 
candidate in the second round of the 2002 presidential election, or the victory of the ‘No’ in the 
referendum on the European constitutional treaty in 2005 against the recommendation of the vast 
majority of the parliament. 
The most common analyses of the French and Italian political crises have highlighted the role 
of non-economic factors: political corruption or the fall of the Berlin Wall for Italy, insecurity and 
immigration issues for France.9 Another interpretation, consistent with the difficulty of carrying out 
neoliberal reforms in both countries, is also possible: a sufficiently strong social base would not exist 
in either country to support the reforms made indispensable by the new international context and 
the evolution of capitalism. Hence the contradiction that might explain the political crisis would be 
that exogenous economic constraints impose reforms that are not supported by a majority of voters; 
                                               
9
 For example: Tiberj (2008) 
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the political crisis would thus be the outcome of difficulties caused by these necessary economic, 
political and electoral reforms. 
It is indeed essential to link the political crisis and the economic reform strategy pursued by 
the government in both countries. However, we argue that the interpretation of the relationship 
between economic and political dynamics sketched above is unsatisfactory for at least two reasons. 
First, because the gradual opening of the Italian and French economies and even more the 
implication of both countries in the European integration is in a very large part the consequence of 
deliberate policy choices: they can hardly be regarded as purely exogenous factors that would 
destabilise pre-existing political equilibriums. Second, because the explicitly neoliberal programs 
which were electorally successful in both countries in the mid-2000s appeared after the outbreak of 
the political crisis. One cannot therefore consider that the neoliberal orientation of these programs is 
the fundamental cause of the political crisis. 
The programs of a neoliberal ‘rupture’ in both countries in the 2000s have been designed as 
a response to the respective political crises. Once the formerly existing social alliances have been 
broken, the need to reconstitute a functional dominant social bloc has dictated the political agenda: 
the political crisis will therefore persist until a politically-validated strategy of mediation between 
social expectations is found. The strategy of a neoliberal ‘rupture’ can thus be interpreted as an 
attempt to rebuild a dominant social alliance, rather than the political expression of the difficulty to 
adapt to exogenous economic constraints. 
If there are similarities between the two countries, there are also significant differences 
finding their roots in the divergent social and economic structures: the weight of the public sector 
and large firms in France contrast with the importance of (very) small firms and precarious workers in 
Italy. This paper shows that the ‘hard core’ of the neoliberal social bloc is roughly the same in both 
countries: self-employed, storekeepers, craftsmen and small entrepreneurs. However, this core 
constitutes a minority of the electorate; a neoliberal strategy must therefore rely on an extended 
social coalition. In France, Sarkozy’s program of a neoliberal ‘rupture’ has been designed as a 
mediation between the expectations of the ‘hard core’ on one hand, and the bulk of private sector 
wage-earners on the other hand. In Italy, Berlusconi's strategy was to form an alliance between the 
‘hard core’ on one hand, and the precarious and assisted classes on the other hand. 
In spite of having almost identical discourses, we argue the neoliberal strategies are different 
in France and in Italy. Similarly, the reasons behind the difficulties and the likely failure of the 
neoliberal agenda in both countries are different. In the program of Sarkozy for the presidential 
election in 2007, the mediation among the key groups that would form the new dominant bloc 
consisted of the implementation of a ‘French-style’ flexicurity designed to allay private sector wage-
earners’ fears about labour market flexibility. In Italy, Berlusconi’s basic commitment vis-à-vis the 
precarious and assisted classes depended on the ability of neoliberal reforms to foster growth and 
employment. 
The Great Recession has posed major problems for the pursuit of the neoliberal strategy in 
each country. In France, the simultaneous presence of high unemployment and the need to control 
public debt was an obstacle to the viability of a system of ‘flexicurity’. This project has been 
(temporarily?) abandoned by the right coalition and Sarkozy was forced to choose between an 
‘unadulterated’ neoliberal reform corresponding to the expectations of the self-employed and small 
entrepreneurs, and the rejection of radical neoliberal labour market reforms likely to feed private 
sector employees’ concern. After a long period of hesitation, the second option was favoured. This 
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explains both the absence of significant reforms in the labour market, and the rise of the Front 
National (FN), whose core electorate is mostly among self-employed.10 
In Italy, the Great Recession has also been a problem, since by impeding growth and fuelling 
the increase in unemployment it has turned the precarious classes away from Berlusconi. However, if 
the pace of neoliberal reforms has been significantly reduced, Berlusconi did not change his priorities 
between meeting the expectations of the self-employed or meeting those of the assisted and 
precarious classes; the former have been privileged.11 
These different strategic choices partly depend on the positioning of the Left-wing parties in 
each country. In France, the Left proposes a program involving some protection for private 
employees, who could otherwise defect to the Right or abstain if the Left chose a neoliberal path. In 
Italy, the Left has found nothing better to propose to the precarious classes than the promise of 
growth based on a neoliberal supply-side policy. The absence of a genuine alternative political supply 
makes the disappointment of precarious classes less politically costly for Berlusconi. 
The article is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the relative stability of socio-political 
alliances until the 1980s in France and in Italy, using the concept of dominant social bloc. Section 3 
analyses the factors that led to the breaking-up of these alliances. The difficulties met by the Left in 
proposing a strategy differentiated from neo-liberalism in France and in Italy are compared in the 
following section. Section 5 considers the respective neo-liberal options for Berlusconi and Sarkozy. A 
brief conclusion follows. 
2. Political equilibrium and dominant social blocs  
a. Political equilibrium and political crisis 
A situation of political crisis will be defined in what follows in reference to a political 
equilibrium. In the political economy approach developed in Amable (2003) and in Amable and 
Palombarini (2009), the viability of a socio-economic model depends on its capacity to regulate a 
social conflict whose roots are to be found in the differentiation of socio-economic interests of 
individual and collective agents, and the heterogeneity of the social expectations and demands that 
follows from this differentiation. As rules of the social game, the institutions specific to a given model 
of capitalism play a major role in the possible regulation of the social conflict. Indeed, institutions (i) 
contribute to structuring socio-economic relations; (ii) organise the political representation space, i.e. 
the space within which political supply will compete; (iii) delineate, through the constraints that they 
define, the strategy space available to political actors in their search for a successful mediation; (iv) 
condition the impact of public policies on economic dynamics and, consequently, on social demands. 
The analysis of the links between the institutional, economic and political dynamics is based 
on a few theoretical concepts. A situation where social conflict is regulated is defined as a political 
equilibrium, i.e. a situation where the contestation stemming from social groups whose demands 
have been disregarded by the political leadership is limited to a minority position in the political 
representation space or repressed with the help of legitimate violence. ‘Dominant’ social groups, i.e. 
those whose demands are taken into account in the definition of public policy, form in such a 
situation a dominant social bloc (DSB). Therefore, social conflict is regulated and a political 
                                               
10
 At the local elections of March 2011 the Front National (far right) obtained 15.2% of the vote, the UMP (Sarkozy’s party) 
17%. According to a survey from Opinionway, the score of the FN among self-employed would be 37% against 25% for the 
UMP. However, the UMP obtained 33% of the votes of private sector employees against 11% for the FN (Poll OpinionWay - 
Fiducial for LCI: Profile of abstainers and voters, and motivations of the vote, 20 March 2011). 
11
 This also explains the extreme modesty of the anti-recession plan in 2009/2010 in Italy. 
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equilibrium exists when there is a stable DSB composed with different social groups that support the 
strategy of political mediation implemented by political actors. 
The role of political leadership is to select among social demands those that will be satisfied 
and those that will be left unsatisfied. Several parameters influence this political decision: resource 
availability and the macroeconomic context, the specific content of the demands and their reciprocal 
compatibility... But the main criterion that political actors take into account is the ability of the 
different social groups to supply electoral and more generally political support in exchange for the 
satisfaction of their demands. Political actors, e.g. parties, need support in order to strengthen their 
position in the competitive field of partisan representation. A social conflict is regulated when the 
strategy of the governing party or coalition permits to obtain the support necessary for political 
validation, i.e. when social and political contestation is not sufficient to destabilise political 
leadership or force it to change its course. 
A political crisis is a situation where there is no room for political mediation between social 
groups belonging to the dominant bloc within a given institutional structure. The existing institutional 
structure may prevent not only the renewing of the former dominant social bloc but also the 
emergence of any new dominant bloc. One must distinguish between a situation of political crisis, 
corresponding to the break-up of a given dominant bloc, and a situation of systemic crisis, in which 
political actors experience difficulties in finding some institutional change strategies in order to 
aggregate a social bloc that could become dominant. Such a situation is marked by a high degree of 
instability. No political strategy is able to generate the political support it needs to stabilise a given 
political leadership. 
In a situation of systemic crisis, strategies aiming to reconstruct or stabilise the former DSB or 
to form a new DSB must include some institutional change, which means questioning past 
compromises and reopening some previously settled social conflict. This is a period where political 
leadership is bound to intervene more directly, in order to find a way to aggregate enough groups in 
a new bloc. This intervention could also lead to an aggravation of the situation of some groups and 
threaten their existence as such, through an intensification of the divergence of interests within each 
group. 
This theoretical position leads to reconsider the concepts of complementarity and hierarchy 
of institutions. From a social group’s point of view, two institutions are complementary when their 
joint presence favours the protection of the interests that define the group. From the point of view 
of a given political strategy, complementarity is defined in reference to the formation of a specific 
dominant social bloc. The joint presence of institutions should permit to widen the space for political 
mediation between groups liable to form the DSB. These two types of complementarity do not 
necessarily associate the same configuration of institutions. 
The hierarchy among institutions can be defined with respect to the importance that an 
institution has for a social group or for the stability of a political compromise. For a socio-political 
group, hierarchically superior institutions are those that matter most for the interests of the group. 
Hierarchy from the point of view of political mediation refers to the question of the formation of 
social alliances and the establishment of a dominant social bloc. In a political equilibrium, an 
institution is all the more important that its questioning or alteration would imply difficulties for the 
existence of the dominant compromise. In equilibrium, the dominant compromise and hierarchically 
superior institutions validate each other; institutions are instrumental in the establishment of the 
compromise and, in return, dominant groups politically validate these institutions. 
b. Social alliances before the crisis in Italy and in France 
The socio-political alliances before the political crises in Italy and in France are briefly 
presented below. The main characteristics are summed up in Tables 1 and 2.  
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For Italy, one should consider the existence of at least five different groups (Palombarini 
2001). The first one includes the large private companies, traditionally established in the Genoa-
Milan-Turin triangle. The political demand of large firms can be summarised in three elements: a 
macroeconomic configuration that ensures the international competitiveness of their production; a 
model of industrial relations functional to their objectives; a public intervention in terms of direct 
support of the effective demand and various transfers. 
The second group consists of the employees of these large companies. Following the 
definition of sociologist Arnaldo Bagnasco they form the ‘central’ working-class, which is unionized 
and, until the late 1980s, politically represented by the communist party. Interests shared by group 
members are the preservation (or growth) of real wages and pensions, the fight against 
unemployment and the protection of the guarantees specified in the Workers’ Statute. 
Small entrepreneurs and their employees may be considered as part of one and the same 
group. Small and medium size enterprises have built their success on the ability to overcome the 
limits of the Taylorist organisation prevailing in large industrial firms. They combine the typical 
flexibility of small businesses with the exploitation of economies of scale in the industrial district. 
These features and the low rate of unionization of workers in the Italian northeast explain why the 
political demand of the workers of this part of the country is summed up by the competitive viability 
of the firms that employ them. 
The interests of small and medium size firms are partly complementary to those of large 
firms. The integration between the production cycles of the two sectors remains considerable. But 
compared to the old Fordist industries, medium- and small-size firms are more export oriented. 
Moreover, public sector demand is rarely addressed to their productions. Finally, they have less need 
for a mediation of the State in their management of industrial relations. The political demands of the 
group are therefore more related to factors determining export competitiveness (labour costs, 
interest rates, exchange rates, etc.), and less to public resources put into play by the budgetary policy 
of the government. The answer to the expectations of the social classes related to the bureaucracy, 
the administration and public firms (which form the fourth group), which are mostly present in the 
southern regions of the country, is on the other hand connected to public resources directed in 
support of their income and fiscal policy. 
The last political demand one may consider comes from the classes linked to rents, requiring 
high interest rates, the development of the stock exchange and a strong supply of public bonds. The 
rentiers are highly concentrated in the North of the country (and more particularly in the ‘industrial 
triangle’). 
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Table 1. Italy: socio-political groups in the 1980s. 
 Socio-political 
group 
Most likely 
location 
Political demand 
 
 
 
 
 
Dominant 
Social Bloc 
Large industrial 
firms 
Milan-Torino-
Genoa 
• Macroeconomic policy 
favourable to competitiveness 
• State intervention in social 
bargaining 
• Public intervention for 
sustaining effective demand 
and various transfers (Cassa 
integrazione, fiscal measures…) 
Small firms and 
their employees 
North-East and 
Centre 
• Macroeconomic policy 
favourable to competitiveness 
Assisted classes, 
bureaucracy and 
public firms 
Centre and 
South 
• Public transfers 
Classes linked to 
rents and the 
financial sector 
North • High interest rates 
• Strong supply of public bonds 
• Development of the stock 
exchange 
Excluded 
from the 
dominant 
bloc 
Large firms’ 
employees 
Milan-Torino-
Genoa 
• Increase in real wages 
• Fight against unemployment 
• Protection and extension of 
social rights 
To sum up, the dominant social bloc in Italy in the 1980s was an alliance between large and 
small firms, the classes depending on transfers and the public sector (Palombarini 2001; 2003). The 
stability of this alliance was made possible by the growth of public debt, an element which would 
eventually prove to be destabilising. The employees of the small firms, having their interests aligned 
with those of their employers, were included in the dominant bloc. Large firm employees on the 
other hand were excluded from this bloc and had their vote partly ‘frozen’ on the communist party 
(PCI). 
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Table 2. France: socio-political groups in the 1980s. 
 Socio-political group Political demand 
 Right 
bloc 
Independents • Low tax level 
• Limits to redistributive social protection 
Private sector 
executives 
• Low tax level 
• Public intervention to support 
competitiveness 
Farmers and 
agricultural workers 
• Public transfers, CAP 
• Protection w.r.t. extra-European competition 
 Private sector white 
collars 
• Increase in real wages 
• Macroeconomic policy sustaining effective 
demand 
• Social protection 
Left 
bloc 
 Public sector 
employees 
• Public intervention 
• Macroeconomic policy sustaining effective 
demand 
• Increase in real wages 
Private sector blue 
collars 
• Increase in real wages 
• Macroeconomic policy sustaining effective 
demand 
• Nationalisations  
• Social rights and social protection  
• Protection w.r.t. external competition 
The situation was different in France (Guillaud and Palombarini 2006). Large firm employees 
were a key group in a context where two blocs alternatively dominated the political life since the 
early 1980s. The socio-political landscape of France in the 1980s was, compared with that of today, 
relatively simple: two very different social alliances with expectations differentiated by means of well 
identified political organizations. 
The left bloc, which gathered the majority of the employees of the public sector and the 
working class, was represented by the socialist party (PS) and the other left-wing parties, in particular 
the communist party (PCF), which were allied in the perspective to govern as a coalition. The 
expectations of this bloc were a larger State intervention in the economy, more regulations of the 
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employment relationship and an increase in the standard of living of the categories of the poorest 
wage-earners. 
The right alliance gathered the private sector executives (managers and associate 
professionals), liberal professions, the independents (storekeepers and craftsmen) as well as the 
majority of the agricultural world. It was represented by the Gaullist party and its liberal allies. The 
expectations concerned State intervention as an industrial strategy protecting the national interests, 
i.e. French firms. This bloc was opposed to (further) nationalisations, which represented an essential 
point of the government program of the left. The differentiation of the right bloc from the left 
alliance also concerned the redistributive action of the State; the left alliance wishing to decrease the 
disparities of incomes by increasing taxes, the right alliance preferring a decrease in taxes even at the 
cost of an increase in inequality. 
The main differences between the two countries are worth emphasising: in France there 
were two social blocs represented by two different political coalitions which held power in turn. 
There was, until the 1990s, only one bloc in Italy. The employees of the private sector occupied a 
central position in France, particularly those employed in large firms. This group was excluded from 
the political exchange in Italy. Two main reasons can explain these differences:  (1) political factors, 
including international relations aspects: there was a conventio ad excludendum against the Italian 
communist party (PCI), not unlike what took place under the 4th Republic in France; (2) socio-
economic factors: large firms play a considerably more important role in France in terms of GDP and 
employment than in Italy, which implies a larger political weight for their employees. 
3. The break-up of the dominant social blocs 
a. The break-up of the dominant social bloc in Italy 
The political crisis broke up in Italy in 1992. It first appeared as a consequence of the 
widespread and organised political corruption, unveiled in broad daylight by a series of criminal 
investigations, the most important being known as Mani Pulite. However, the events that followed 
each other over the years showed that the problem was not only a matter of ethical criticisms 
addressed by the ‘civil society’ to the ruling elites. Neither was it a consequence of the ‘atypical’ 
configuration of the Italian political party structure: an important communist party excluded by 
necessity from government, and a Christian-democratic party assuming by necessity all the inter-
class compromises. Indeed, according to this latter view the 1992 crisis would be a side effect of the 
fall of the Soviet Union and its impact on Western communist parties. 
This view is not satisfactory. First, all the parties of what is now called the ‘first Republic’ 
disappeared following the events of 1992, including those parties which were not involved in corrupt 
practices. Second, political instability carried on well beyond the considerable renewal of the ruling 
classes: no incumbent government was re-elected between 1992 and 2011. Finally, if one persisted 
in seeing the crisis of the early 1990s as simply the result of a revolt against moral corruption or a 
mere consequence of the fall of the Berlin wall, it would be difficult to account for the changes that 
followed the crisis and altered the Italian socio-economic structure (see Appendix Table A1). 
In the political sphere, the proportional voting system was abandoned, the powers of the 
executive greatly increased, and an important administrative decentralization process was initiated. 
In the economy, privatizations dismantled the system of public companies, which had for sixty years 
played a major role in the organization of Italian capitalism. The system of PAYG pensions partly gave 
way to a funded system. The labour market was significantly liberalized. The most important sectors 
of the economy were opened to competition. 
The amazing duration and the profound effects of the Italian ‘transition’ can be understood if 
one analyses the political crisis of the early 1990s as the consequence of the breaking-up of the 
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 dominant social bloc over the previous decades. The social groups of the dominant bloc carried very 
heterogeneous expectations. Large industrial firms in the North were benefiting from public 
expenditure linked to industrial restructuring (including the 
assisted classes in the South benefited from transfers. These expenditures were not financed by a 
rise in taxation, to which the Northern social groups were opposed. It should be noted that the fight 
against the ‘fiscal burden’ will become a major them
1980s on. Public debt was therefore the main adjustment variable between the various demands of 
these groups: relative to GNP, its weight doubled between 1981 and 1993 (Figure 1). At the same 
time, the rise of public debt was welcomed by the 
income with rising profitability. 
Figure 1. Italy: public debt as a percentage of GNP.
During the 1980s, the economic policy regime favoured the domination of employers in 
labour relations and combined three factors. (i) A relatively expansionary fiscal policy: as seen in 
Figure 2, Italy's budget policy in the mid
(ii) The rigidity of exchange rates: t
European Monetary System (EMS) in 1989 and started to stabilise its currency in the mid
EMS functioned as a quasi fixed exchange rate system, and this imposed strong constraints on 
economic policy. (iii) Low real wage protection against inflation: since 1984 the inflation indexation 
mechanism (scala mobile) was weakened.
Factors (ii) and (iii) made any conflicts over wages and inflation very costly for trade unions, 
which were also weakened by the r
late 1970s and early 1980s. The expansionary policy thus benefited primarily to groups within the 
dominant social bloc. 
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rentier group since it guaranteed them a risk
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 Figure 2. Italy’s discretionary fiscal policy.
From the mid-1980s on, the political mediation between the dominant expectations 
produced a series of contradictions.
(a) The rise of the socio-economic interests related to financial rent within the dominant social 
bloc (Figure 3).12 The increased weight of these groups made the
complex since their interests conflicted with those of firms, notably on the value of the real 
interest rate. 
Figure 3. Italy/France: net government interest payments, as a percentage of GDP.
(b) The rise of interest rate levels (Fi
linked to rent but detrimental to those linked to industry.
                                               
12
 For a complete analysis of the weight of the financial rent on the distribution of income in Italy
 
 
 political mediation more 
gure 4): this evolution was positive for the interest groups 
 
, see Alvi (2006).
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 Figure 4. Italy/France: long
(c) Exchange rate rigidity without cooperative industrial relations led to a worse
competitiveness, as can be seen in the rise of the real exchange rate (Figure 5).
Figure 5. Italy: real and nominal exchange rates. Performance relative to the rest of the 
former EU-15: double export weights. 2000=100.
The growing importance of interest groups related to rent, higher interest rates and the loss 
of external competitiveness are endogenous consequences of the policy mediation chosen by the 
Italian governments during the 1980s. The polarization between two f
increased within the social base of the 
government. Assisted classes, public bureaucracy and 
implemented, and kept on supporting the government. By contrast, the interests associated with 
production (small firms and their employees and large firms) were gradually sacrificed by this policy.
The first groups to express their discontent were the self
They did not benefit from an economic policy regime primarily functional to the domination of the 
large firms in industrial relations, while they paid the price of the loss in competitiveness mentioned 
previously, especially considering that many s
2004). Self-employed and small entrepreneurs form the core social base of the Northern League 
(Lega Norte), which won its first electoral success in the mid 1980s. The 
-term real interest rates. 
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to the government but sociologically close to the social base of the governing parties, Christian 
Democracy in particular. But in the early 1990s even Confindustria (the business union, which at that 
time represented the major industrial groups) strongly urged a policy change. 
Thus, at the end of the First Republic (and before the start of the Mani Pulite investigation) 
all the groups linked to production were opposed to the policy implemented by the government: 
workers and clerks, whose vote was traditionally frozen on the PCI and were consequently excluded 
from political exchange; the self-employed and small firms (and their employees), which provided 
support to the Northern League; and large firms, whose newspaper (Il sole 24 ore) launched in the 
early 1990s daily attacks against the policy of the government, accused of wasting  public resources. 
The government responded to these attacks with a strongly restrictive policy in order to curb 
the rise in public debt and keep the support of firms. But in the short term this policy change 
increased the dissatisfaction and accelerated the breakup of the political crisis. 
The policy followed by the first Berlusconi government (10 May 1994 to 17 January 1995) can 
be interpreted as an attempt to reconstitute the DSB of the 1980s. Indeed, Berlusconi made two 
different alliances: one with the Lega in the North, and another one with Alleanza Nazionale (a party 
that mainly represents civil servants and assisted classes) in the South and Centre of the country. 
However, the two parties refused an alliance with one another. The short duration of the 
government (the Lega left after 8 months, which led to the fall of the government) is a proof that the 
margins for mediation between the groups of the former DSB no longer existed. 
b. Rifts within both social blocs in France 
The political crisis in France has not been as spectacular as in Italy. One has not seen dozens 
of politicians on a court room bench. But the uproar caused by the presence of Front National’s 
candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen in the second round of 2002 presidential election, or the gap between 
the choice made by a majority of politicians from the government parties on the issue of the 
European constitutional treaty and the outcome of the referendum in 2005 need nevertheless be 
remembered. Furthermore, just as in Italy, no French government has been re-elected since 1978. 
The right-wing victories (presidential or parliamentary elections) of 1995 and 2007 are no exceptions. 
Chirac’s campaign of 1995 was primarily directed against the policy of the government led by his 
‘friend of thirty years’ and fellow RPR member E. Balladur. Main opponent to Chirac on the right side, 
Sarkozy won the 2007 presidential election on a program of radical breakup with both the French 
model and the style of President Chirac and his Prime Minister Villepin. 
The parallels between Italy and France do not stop there, for the most common explanation 
of the French crisis is as unconvincing as those mentioned for Italy. The most commonly-found 
explanation for the emergence of the Front National (FN) and the far right in France is a rejection by 
a large part of the electorate of the immigration policies deemed too tolerant, which both the left 
and the right would have followed for the last forty years. However, this explanation is in open 
contradiction with the opinion polls that show that if there is a certain hostility vis-à-vis immigrants 
in France, this is not a recent phenomenon and it has not risen in the recent years.13 As in Italy, it 
seems that the crisis can be attributed to the difficulty of renewing the social compromises that had 
ensured the political stability in the past.  
The economic crisis of the 1970s, with the slowing down of growth and a strong increase in 
unemployment, and the evolutions of the French model in the 1980s modified little by little the 
                                               
13
 See for instance the post-electoral studies between 1978 and 2007 (CDSP Sciences-Po) and the analysis in Guillaud and 
Palombarini (2006). Immigration is considered as the main problem for the 2007 presidential election by less than 6% of the 
population. Also, one may note that France experienced a serious outburst of racist violence in 1973, with no less than fifty 
murders (Gastaut 1993). However, J.-M. Le Pen obtained only 0.75% of the votes at the presidential election the following 
year. 
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socio-political landscape. The opposition of the right and left blocs on the issue of public intervention 
aggravated and took new forms in the 1980s, after the left government took the ‘turn of the rigour’, 
i.e. promoted restrictive macroeconomic policies in order to fight inflation, stay in the European 
Monetary System (EMS), and later qualify for the European Monetary Union (EMU). Within the left 
bloc, workers and clerks of the public sector would be asking for an increase in the role of the State. 
Within the right bloc, the self-employed (storekeepers, craftsmen, liberal professions) and the 
average and high income categories of the private sector employees (foremen, executives) wanted a 
reduced public intervention, i.e. a policy in the spirit of the ‘conservative revolution’ that was taking 
place in Great Britain with the governments led by M. Thatcher, or in the United States under the 
presidencies of R. Reagan. 
As shown in Guillaud and Palombarini (2006), rifts appeared within each of the two social 
blocs, and destabilised the electoral base of the right and the left.  On the right side, the demand for 
a Thatcherite policy expressed by the self-employed was not shared by private sector employees. In 
1988, 53% of the craftsmen and shopkeepers were in favour of privatisation, i.e. more than the 
average of the population (43.5%), while private sector employees were slightly less favourable to 
privatisations than the average (40.6 %). Similarly, if the average voter held a possible removal of 
social security as ‘very serious’ with an 87.6% majority, only 78% of craftsmen and storekeepers 
concurred, against 90% of private sector employees. Two reference groups for the government 
parties’ right found themselves on opposite sides on a possible Thatcherite turning point for 
economic policy: the craftsmen and storekeepers requested it strongly, while private sector 
employees showed a stronger hostility towards it than the average voter. 
The divide was no less serious on the left side. The election of F. Mitterrand as president in 
1981 put an end to 23 years of right-wing domination. Mitterrand was elected on a clearly left-wing 
platform, with the support of the communist party (PCF). The economic platform was based on two 
main types of intervention: (i) a series of structural reforms including a large program of 
nationalisations (leading to a State control of 75% of industry and almost 100% of the financial 
sector) and the extension of labour rights; (ii) a macroeconomic expansion program based on budget 
impulse, an increase in pensions, benefits and wages. This latter component, classically Keynesian in 
its inspiration, proved to be insufficient to overcome the economic crisis and reverse the 
unemployment increasing trend. It accelerated inflation, increased foreign trade deficit and 
compelled the government to three devaluations of the French Franc in two years. 
After the failure of the expansionary policy, the alternative was the following: either (a) 
pursue an expansionary path, accept a high inflation rate and consequently opt out of the EMS; or (b) 
stay in the EMS, adopt a deflationary policy to preserve the value of the French currency vis-à-vis the 
other European currencies, and accept unemployment.14 The latter option was chosen by F. 
Mitterrand after a period of hesitation. This was not simply an economic but also a political choice. 
Indeed, the expectations of a demand-supporting and unemployment-fighting macroeconomic policy 
were at the centre of the social demands of the core groups of the left bloc (Table 2). To relinquish 
this part of the program of the left would necessarily have consequences for the socio-political base 
of the government, particularly the working class. It would imply accepting the risk of having the 
popular classes out of the bloc and envisaging the possibility of new alliances, presumably with the 
fraction of the middle classes which were favourable to some aspects of the left program but 
reluctant to nationalisations, a strong State intervention in the economy or a political alliance with 
the PCF. The economic turn in the economic policy of 1983-1984 is therefore also a political turn and 
the beginning of a search of an alliance with social groups and political forces at the centre of the 
                                               
14
 The ‘failure’ is for the most part the high level of the external deficit. 
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left-right divide.15 Two (related) elements could indeed have favoured a centre-PS alliance: (i) the 
diverging expectations within the right bloc regarding the desirability of a strong neoliberal reform 
program, and (ii) the rise of the FN. The first element could be instrumental in having the social 
groups tempted by a moderately neoliberal program drift away from the right bloc. Moreover, the 
fear of an alliance between the traditional right parties and the FN because of the increasing political 
weight of the latter could push these groups towards supporting a centre-PS political alliance. 
A first step in this direction was the absence of the communist party from the government 
led by L. Fabius in 1984. A second important element was the change in the electoral law. For the 
first (and only) time under the 5th Republic, the legislative elections of 1986 would be held under a 
proportional representation rule. The most common interpretation of this political move is the desire 
of F. Mitterrand to limit the extent of a very possible victory of the right in terms of parliament 
representation, and to enable the representation of the FN with which the traditional right parties 
could not make an alliance in the political context of the times. Another and certainly more 
important aspect of the choice of the PR rule is that it would favour the break-up of the left-right 
divide and lead to the possibility of a centre-PS alliance. The victory of the RPR-UDF alliance made 
this recomposing of the French political life superfluous (Table 3). 
Table 3. France: results of the first round of parliament elections (vote shares). 
 1978 1981 1986 1988 1993 1997 2002 2007 
PS+MRG+DVG 24,7 38,2 32,1 37,5 20,1 27,8 27,9 28,0 
PCF 20,6 16,1 9,8 11,2 9,1 9,9 4,9 4,3 
Far left 3,3 1,3 1,5 0,4 1,7 2,5 2,8 3,4 
Green party 2,1 1,1 1,2 0,4 4,0 4,4 4,5 3,3 
         
UMP / RPR-UDF 46,7 42,9 44,6 40,5 44,1 36,2 43,9 45,6 
MODEM - - - - - - - 7,6 
FN / Far right - 0,4 9,7 9,7 12,9 15,3 12,2 4,7 
The defeat of the socialist government was largely the consequence of the change in 
economic policy. The main objective of macroeconomic policy was the fight against inflation in order 
to stabilise the currency and keep the nominal peg of the FF to the DM in order to stay in the EMS. 
The consequences in terms of economic policy as well as macroeconomic performance were 
clear. The budget policy became far less expansionary and in fact pro-cyclical in the early 1980s, with 
the adoption of a restrictive stance in spite of the economic slowdown (Figures 6 and 7). The pro-
cyclical character was kept until the end of the 1980s and found again under the right-wing Juppé 
government between 1995 and 1997. Monetary policy was in line with these options, with a 
restrictive stance which lasted until the beginning of the 1990s and was partly reversed with the 
recession of 1993. 
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 One may argue that this was F. Mitterrand’s original plan and that the alliance of the socialists with the communist party, 
as well as the social base corresponding to this political alliance, was but a first necessary step in the conquest of power and 
not a long-lasting situation. 
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 Figure 6. France: budget policy.
Figure 7. France/Italy: short term real interest rates.
The macroeconomic outcomes were a significant slowdown of inflation (Figure 8) and
stabilisation of the French currency (Figure 9), but mostly after the EMS crises of 1992
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 Figure 8. France/Italy: price deflator GDP at market prices. Performance relative to the rest of 
the former EU-15. 1980=100.
Figure 9. France: nominal exchange rate of the French currency. 1980=100.
The price of this policy was paid in terms of unemployment (Figure 10), whose rate rose 
rapidly in the early 1980s and never fell under 8% even during the relatively fast growth periods of 
the end of the 1980s and 1990s. 
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 Figure 10. France/Italy: unemployment rates.
These macroeconomic evolutions had clear consequences for the socio
left. The groups that mostly suffered from the consequences of the economic crisis no lon
supported the government. The consequences were most clearly felt by the communist party, whose 
vote share losses are clearly related to its participation to a socialist
and 1997-2002 (see Table 3 above). One notices that th
the 1986-1997 period, corresponding to its absence from the government coalition or in the 
opposition. This questions also the popular thesis according to which the decline of the communist 
party would be linked to the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of Soviet Union.
The re-election of President Mitterrand in 1988 gave the socialist party a new opportunity to 
pursue the search for a centre-
‘second left’, called for a ‘big bang’ in the French political life, i.e. a radical break
alliances.16 It did not take place however. The second mandate of F. Mitterrand was less active in 
terms of neoliberal reforms, but macroeconomic polic
of European monetary unification and the single market. The policy of nominal peg to the DM proved 
to be particularly costly in terms of unemployment and the left lost the 1993 legislative election.
The victory of the left at the 1997 parliament election was preceded by another setback in 
the quest for the centrist alliance. Former Finance minister of F. Mitterrand and former head of the 
European Commission, J. Delors, turned down the offer to run for the 1995
Indeed, J. Delors could not hope to obtain the political majority necessary to the implementation of 
his preferred policy, acknowledging the impossibility of building a centrist alliance breaking from the 
opposition between a left and a right bloc.
The 1997 election was then won by L. Jospin fronting a five
support of the traditional left bloc.
showing a public opposition to the then fashionable ‘t
marked by a blatant deepening of the neo
markets and financial system are concerned (see Appendix Table A2). Jospin’s governments 
privatised more companies than the right
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 The so-called ‘second left’ was opposed to the Marxist and even to the Jacobin heritage of the left. It was therefore 
against a State control of the economy and thus nationalisations, favouring market regulation and social dialogue. 
Politically, it looked for alliances away from the communist party and in direction of the centre.
17 
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steps towards the conversion of the French financial and corporate governance system to Anglo-
Saxon standards (Tiberghien 2007). 
The strategy was to neo-liberalise, or ‘modernise’ in the newspeak of the PS, those areas of 
the economy that were not too sensitive for the socio-political basis of the left, i.e. not too high up in 
the institutional hierarchy of the left bloc (social protection and labour rights). Deep transformations 
affecting the financial and corporate governance system were thus traded against some extensions 
of employment protection, an increase in public employment and the 35-hours week, itself an 
ambiguous reform which decreased the duration of the legal working week while at the same time 
extending the flexibility of work organisation. The logic behind those reforms was the achievement of 
a transformation of the French model into a neoliberal/social hybrid model, whose stability is highly 
questionable if one considers the complementarity between institutions (Amable 2003; 2009; Deeg 
and Jackson 2007). Again, this was at odds with the expectations of the social base of the left. The 
end-result was another electoral defeat: the absence of the left candidate, L. Jospin, from the second 
round of the 2002 presidential election for the first time since 1969, because a large part of the left 
votes went to candidates that opposed the neoliberal course of the Jospin government.18 
To sum up, the three experiences of PS-led governments were dominated by the same logic: 
the pursuit of a ‘modernisation’ (i.e. neoliberalisation) of the French economy, which had for 
consequence to alienate the popular classes and push the emergence of a vote for non traditional 
parties, both on the right and on the left. Following the median voter model logic, the socialist 
leaders thought that the middle classes were the key target of their political action, which led them 
to neglect the working class. Ironically, this has been more detrimental to the communist party’s 
electoral base than to that of the PS. The disaffection of the popular classes with the left has in fact 
made the centre-PS alliance more realistic. 
Neoliberal policies are also at the core of the problems affecting the right bloc. The right 
alliance around the RPR-UDF/UMP coalition has been in office three times for two years in 1986-
1988, 1993-1995 and 1995-1997, and again since 2002. The Chirac government of 1986 took a large 
inspiration from the ‘conservative revolution’ taking place in the UK and the US, and came to power 
with an ambition to drastically change the course of the French economy. The reform program was 
centred on privatisations, i.e. a reversal of the policy followed by the left alliance in 1981, and, less 
centrally, on labour market flexibilisation. A large program of privatisations was launched and the 
necessity for a firm to obtain the authorisation of the public administration to lay off employees was 
suppressed. This had important consequences for the possibility that firms would have to implement 
restructuring policies involving substantial labour force layoffs. This neo-liberal orientation caused 
some problems even within the social base of the right. A rift within the right bloc emerged in the 
1980s, opposing groups expressing demands for a strong labour market flexibility (artisans, 
storekeepers, independents) to those that felt threatened by it (private sector employees). Firms did 
use the possibility offered by the liberalisation of layoffs to restructure their activities and this 
affected deeply the private sector labour force. A neo-liberal labour market flexibility, and to a lesser 
extent some privatisations, clashed against the demands for economic security, public services and 
redistribution of some groups within the right bloc, mostly the private sector employees. Chirac’s 
1986 attempt corresponded more to an alignment to the expectations of one part of its social base 
than to a mediation between the various demands of the right bloc. 
The failure of the 1986-1988 experience had a lasting impact on the political strategies 
followed by the right. The leading politicians on the right acknowledged that the strong demand for a 
liberalisation and flexibilisation of the labour market of one part of the right electorate was difficult 
to reconcile with the demands for security expressed by private sector employees. This fundamental 
contradiction explains the cautiousness with which labour market reforms were undertaken until 
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 Indeed, Trotskyite candidates gathered 11% of the votes while Jospin’s score was a little over 16%. 
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Sarkozy’s presidency. The only significant attempts to flexibilise the labour market were always made 
at the margins, i.e. on targeted labour force groups.19 
The Balladur government of 1993-1995 refrained from significantly changing labour market 
institutions and concentrated instead on pursuing a program of privatisations, with an aim to 
constitute stable shareholder cores (noyaux durs), chosen by the Ministry of Finance. A first 
significant welfare retrenchment reform concerned private sector pensions, a risky move considering 
the social base of the right. Although it went without causing any significant reactions from the 
labour unions, it was not without consequences on the difficulties met by E. Balladur in its 
competition for leadership on the right with J. Chirac: indeed, the latter saw an opportunity in 
moving to the centre and proposed a mediation between the right bloc’s divergent demands 
different from Balladur’s neo-liberal orientation. At the 1995 presidential election, Chirac beat 
Balladur in the first round and ultimately won the election against Jospin in the second round, 
adopting an almost centre-left position, criticising the lack of reaction of the Balladur government 
against growing inequalities (the fracture sociale), and promising a reflationary policy aiming at 
improving purchasing power. The propositions of Chirac proved effective in reuniting the right bloc. 
However, once elected Chirac and his Prime Minister A. Juppé embarked on a more classically neo-
liberal course than what the calls against the fracture sociale had led voters to believe. 
A significant turning point was the failure of the pension reform in 1995. A. Juppé was 
cautious enough to target a group that was a major part of the left bloc, the civil servants and public 
company employees, with their special regimes for pensions. The aim of the reform was to align the 
special regimes on the general regime of the private sector, which implied a drop in pension levels. 
The reform even obtained the support of a certain number of academics and intellectuals 
traditionally considered as supporting the left. Yet, the opposition to the pension reform was massive 
and turned into a movement against neo-liberal policies in general, which not only reunited the 
popular classes with the left bloc, but also gathered support in the ranks of the private sector 
employees, who supported a movement they were not able to carry on two years earlier, when their 
own pensions were at stake. 
To sum up, both the left and the right blocs were therefore characterised by the existence of 
contradictions between the expectations of the various social groups composing them. This double 
fracture has caused the rise of the extremes and especially the far-right party Front National, which 
proposed a particular mix of radical neo-liberalism domestically and protectionism in trade policy.20 
The FN captured those disappointed by the right for being too cautious on labour market and social 
protection reforms, and voters disillusioned by a left that they consider slave to the demands of a 
neo-liberal Europe. In parallel, the poorest categories of the left bloc drifted away from the socialist 
party, which had been governing for the most part of the 1980s. On the government parties’ side, 
the common tendency was thus to shrink the hard core of their electoral base to the high and 
average income categories – of the public sector for the left, of the private sector for the right. 
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 Such tempted adjustments at the margins are for instance Villepin’s CPE (contrat première embauche) for under-25 
year’s workers and CNE (contrat nouvelle embauche) for very small firms: both contracts were intended to allow firms to 
lay off workers during the first 2 years, after what the contract would have became a permanent contract. However, the 
CPE was never implemented given major street demonstrations, whereas the CNE was suppressed only a few months after 
being implemented. 
20
 Among the propositions of the Front National, one could find the abolition of the income and inheritance taxes, the 
lowering of the tax on firms’ benefits, and the limitation of the share of public expenditure relative to GDP to 25%. 
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4. The problems met by left strategies 
a. Italy 
Prodi's first government (1996-1998) was a new experiment for Italy since it was the first 
direct participation of the Left to a government. It was also the first attempt to end the political crisis 
by proposing a new social alliance, the so-called ‘Producers’ Pact’. This experiment was extended 
until 2001 by the D'Alema government (the first and only time an ex-PCI member has led a 
government in Italy) and the second Amato government. The achievements of these governments 
are commonly considered as ‘outstanding’: Italy was in the first group of countries to join the euro, 
public debt was first stabilised and then reduced, interest rates and inflation levels dropped. The 
ruling class convinced itself it had done marvellous job and expressed a large amount of self-
satisfaction.21 However, the electorate held an altogether different view and the very negative 
opinion it had of the government (ITANES survey 2001) led to the defeat of the centre-left coalition 
in the 2001 elections. 
In the 2001 elections, the centre-left won most of its votes among voters who considered the 
following themes as priorities: European integration, the fight against tax evasion and public 
corruption, protecting the environment, schools and health; i.e. Europe, welfare state and moral 
issues. On the other hand, the centre-right won the most votes among voters who considered those 
issues as priorities: the fight against unemployment, lower inflation, lower taxes, the economic 
backwardness of the south, and the fight against crime and illegal immigration; therefore centre-
right voters were concerned with not only security issues, but all the economic issues. 
If one looks at the voting behaviour according to socio-professional categories, the following 
can be observed. The centre-left obtained only a narrow majority among executives and employees 
of the public sector and among private sector executives. The centre-right obtained a majority mostly 
among the self-employed (businessmen, professionals, merchants, craftsmen), but also among the 
unemployed and workers in both the private and public sector 
To sum up, the opinions of voters, especially the lower classes, on the economic performance 
of the government was clearly negative (Caciagli and Corbetta, 2002). After five years of centre-left 
government, there was a huge gap between the self-evaluation of the political leadership and the 
reaction of a significant part of their electoral base. How can one explain it? 
The contents of the Producers’ Pact must be specified. The stated objectives of the centre-
left were (i) to provide an answer to the dissatisfaction of the producers which led to the end of the 
pentapartito, (ii) to improve the state of public finance and stabilize the public debt, and (iii) to make 
it possible for Italy to join the first group of countries which should participate to the creation of the 
Euro. In the perspective of our theoretical framework, the action of the centre-left must be 
interpreted from a different objective: (iv) to create a new dominant social bloc, a necessary 
condition to put an end to the political crisis which broke out in 1992. 
The action of the first Prodi government can therefore be reinterpreted. Following the 
political rhetoric: (1) the main objective is the entry into the euro; (2) to achieve it requires restrictive 
                                               
21
 For most leaders of the centre-left, the defeat in 2001 is related to problems of communication or political organization. 
Thus V. Visco, Finance minister between 1996 and 2000, wrote the following after the electoral defeat: “the electorate has 
recognized and appreciated the government’s results, which were positive or excellent. We must understand why - despite 
this fact - voters did not identify with our political supply”. In his analysis, the problem is that “the identity and the culture 
of the past have not been overcome”. Undue attention was given “to not losing the qualities, values, symbols of a past that 
- like it or not - is definitely behind us” (V. Visco, La Repubblica, 1 August 2001). This type of critical thinking led the 
‘Democratici di sinistra’ (heirs of the communist party) and the ‘Margherita’ party (born of a split within the Christian 
democrats) to merge into the ‘Democratic Party’. 
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 macroeconomic policies; (3) the 
social peace.22 
An alternative analysis is the following: (1) the formation of a new social alliance is necessary 
to overcome the political crisis; the protagonists of this new alliance are large firms and their 
employees as well as civil servants; (2) the 
alliance; (3) the concertazione is viable only in a context
joining the euro legitimates restrictive policies.
It is worth noting that the Italian 
democratic exchange between public resources and political support. 
cooperative working relationships; business and trade unions were too weak to mobilize support 
significantly; and the employers demanded the drop in inflation and interest rates, both objectives 
being deemed incompatible with an e
resources to gain political support. Indeed, business and trade unions were weakened by the 
European Monetary System; their representativeness was challenged directly in the political realm by 
Berlusconi and his allies. The government gave them legitimacy and protection of vested rights. It 
received in exchange the opportunity to conduct restrictive policies in a context of social peace 
(Figure 11). 
 
Figure 11. Italy: social unrest and inflation.
This strategy represented a new economic policy regime (Table 4).
  
                                               
22
 The ‘concertazione’ is the tripartite bargaining (government
concertazione is necessary to carry out these policies in a context of 
concertazione is necessary for the building of the new 
 of restrictive policies; (4) the objective of 
 
concertazione does not correspond to a classic social 
There was no tradition of 
xpansionary policy. The government has not shared public 
 
 
-employers-unions) on all public policies.
23 
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Table 4. Italy: three economic policy regimes. 
 1975-1983 1985-1991 1996-2001 
 
 
Social alliance 
big industry 
 
SMEs 
 
assisted classes 
 
rentiers 
 
assisted classes 
 
big industry 
 
SMEs 
big industry 
 
private sector 
unionized 
employees 
 
public sector 
employees 
Economic policy… 
 
Budget policy 
 
 
Exchange rate 
 
 
 
strongly 
expansionary 
 
quasi-flexible 
 
 
quite 
expansionary 
 
rigid 
 
 
restrictive 
 
 
fixed 
…and its consequences 
 
Industrial relations 
 
Inflation rate 
 
Public debt 
 
Interest rate 
 
 
 
conflict 
 
>  10% 
 
rising 
 
low but 
increasing 
 
 
dominated 
by firms 
5% - 7% 
 
rising 
 
high 
 
 
 
cooperation 
 
1% - 2% 
 
stabilized 
 
decreasing 
 
The concerted income policy in Italy was made possible by the presence of two factors: (1) in 
the regime of fixed exchange rates, inflation was a cost to the social partners; (2) the fiscal policy had 
reduced the stakes in the conflict between trade unions and business associations. 
In such a situation, the reasons for a distributive conflict had diminished, at least for the parts 
of the wage-earning class and big business that could arrange an exchange between the protection 
of vested rights on one hand, and wage moderation and social stability on the other hand. One can 
think of the Producers’ Pact as a series of concentric circles. At the heart of political exchange was 
the concertazione between big business and unions; further out, the classes related to the public 
sector, then the small and medium-sized firms and their employees, and finally the group of rentiers. 
In the second half of the nineties, the latter group was found to be substantially excluded from the 
mechanisms of formation of economic policy. 
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To be successful, the strategy of the centre-left had to develop a centripetal force, able to 
have groups linked to the production sector, which identified neither with the interests of large firms 
nor with those of unionized workers, joining the new social bloc. The Italian producers’ pact was 
based on the acceptance by large industrial firms and trade unions of several ‘economic constraints’ 
(the financial stability, the stability of the exchange rate...) with respect to which the participation to 
the process of European monetary unification played a decisive role of legitimacy. 
Concertazione and abiding by the Maastricht criteria represented the elements of a new 
policy regime. However, the conditions that enabled the existence of the producers’ pact were the 
same as those that prevented a growth-oriented economic policy. To be viable, the pact between big 
businesses and the unions – which replaced the one between the manufacturing business and 
finance characteristic of the 1980s – was in need of much more abundant resources than what the 
economic policy could provide. 
The pact absorbed resources from the groups which had remained outside of the new social 
bloc. It produced a centrifugal force that moved not only the classes related to financial rent, but also 
the assisted and precarious classes, those related to the world of small and medium-size firms and to 
the public sector, away from the heart of political exchange. If one looks at the location of the 
various groups on the Italian territory, the consideration of this movement contributes to explaining 
the social opposition encountered by the centre-left in the South and in the North-East of the 
country. 
The centre-left governments were unable to resolve the contradiction between on the one 
hand the foundation of an alliance of producers based on a respect of ‘economic constraints’ that 
was incompatible with a development-oriented macroeconomic policy, and on the other hand the 
need for a strong economic growth to ensure the stability of such an alliance. 
The analytical framework developed previously explains why the election program of the first 
Prodi government was not respected. In this program, the objective of the ‘first phase’ of the 
government was the entry into the Euro and the consolidation of public finances; the ‘second phase’ 
would have had for an objective the promotion of economic development (particularly of the South 
of the country) and the decrease in unemployment. Thus, the transition to the second phase was to 
mark the end of restrictive policies. But the ‘second phase’ was never initiated, which led to the 
paradoxical result of the fall of Prodi's first government just after the ‘historical’ achievement of 
joining the Euro.23 
The refusal to adopt a law on the reduction of working hours was the episode that caused 
the fall of the Prodi government. The reduction of working time was at the centre of European 
political debates in the second half of the 1990s, especially in France and Italy. The Italian debate on 
the reduction of working time took on political importance at the initiative of one party of the 
centre-left alliance, the Communist Refoundation Party (PRC). 
In France, the 35-hour law was one of the features of the economic policy of the left coalition 
government led by Lionel Jospin. In Italy the situation was very different. The reduction of working 
time was proposed with great energy by the PRC. However, it was met strong resistance in the 
centre-left. A few days before the fall of his government, Romano Prodi dismissed in these terms the 
charges against him of not keeping commitments on the 35 hour-week: “The text is already in 
Parliament, we have respected the month, the day and the hour. In recent weeks, however, we 
never talked about this theme, Bertinotti [Secretary of the PRC] never referred to the Law of the 35-
hour week. He knows that from the beginning I did not agree with this law, but then we saw that it 
                                               
23
 Faced with the refusal of a shift in economic policy, Rifondazione Comunista left the governing coalition and caused the 
fall of Prodi’s government. The centre-left then regained a parliamentary majority thanks to an alliance with a group of 
centrist, an alliance that supported the D’Alema and Amato’s second governments. 
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did not lead to a deterioration of the situation and we found a way to implement it without any 
damage to the country”.24 
The Italian centre-left (with the exception of the PRC) was opposed to a law regarded as vital 
by the left coalition in France. The explanation is that a law on working time reduction would have 
resulted in a contradiction with the political strategy of the Italian centre-left: the measure would 
have inevitably caused difficulties in the dialogue between the unions and the representatives of big 
business.  After the fall of the Prodi government (1998), the PRC left the alliance and was replaced by 
a group of centrist elected in the ranks of the centre-right. 
In fact, the transition to the ‘second phase’ could not have taken place. Less restrictive 
policies were inconsistent with the specific mechanisms that the centre-left had begun to build with 
the Producers’ Pact. Such policies would have destabilized the social bloc that the centre-left was 
trying to build. This explains the electoral defeat in 2001. 
 - After reaching the goal of joining the euro in 1998, it became more difficult to justify 
restrictive policies; 
- The centre-left failed the expectations concerning social protection and economic 
development that came especially from southern regions; 
- the restrictive policies - central to the strategy - led not only to the strong hostility of groups 
excluded from the alliance, which paid the highest price for fiscal restraint (especially SMEs in the 
North and assisted classes in the South), but also to the dissatisfaction of a fraction of the employees 
(increasing difficulties in the alliance government with the discontent of the ‘radical’ left); 
- following the decision not to pursue a Keynesian expansionary policy, the only strategy for 
growth remained a neo-liberal supply-side oriented policy (privatisations, flexiblisation of the labour 
market). Being associated with such a policy resulted in a weakening of the unions’ influence; 
- the new social bloc was based on an alliance between big business and unions, which 
represent mainly public employees, employees of large firms and retired workers. Were excluded 
from the bloc not only assisted social classes and independents, but also the small and medium 
enterprises as well as the precarious and irregular workers. But since the 1980s large firms’ weight 
was declining in Italy, while SMEs’ weight was increasing. Among workers, employees under 
permanent full time contract represented only one half of the workforce (51% in the first quarter of 
2010, source ISTAT). 
The fundamental problem of the Italian left is therefore to find new social partners. An 
‘alliance between producers’ which excludes small enterprises (and their employees), atypical 
workers and the unemployed, is necessarily a minority alliance in Italy. 
                                               
24
 “Né compromessi né trasformismi” (“Neither compromises nor transformed”), interview by Romano Prodi in La 
Repubblica, October 3, 1998. 
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2011.51
 Figure 12. France/Italy: firm size distribution. Micro firms: 1 to 9 employees. Small firms: 10 
to 49 employees. Medium firms: 50 to 249 employees. Large firms: over 250 employees.
b. France 
The implementation of a leftist policy is made difficult by two types of 
impossibility to carry on an expansionary macroeconomic policy largely because of the constraints 
imposed by the Maastricht criterions and the loss of control of the monetary policy; (ii) the 
difficulties to maintain the stability of t
the post-war compromises in the context of system competition that characterises the European 
Union. The question of European integration has been at the centre of the most important policy 
choices that the governing left had to make since the ‘turn of the rigour’ in 1983. European 
integration has increasingly appeared as a factor of division within the left bloc. Whereas the working 
classes have become sceptical about the European project, the 
of the PS, which strives to appear as ‘responsible’ leaders in the eyes of the European counterparts, 
tend to see European integration as a major if not the main political project, in a period which saw 
the neoliberal dimension of the European project become even more predominant, with the single 
market, or the European monetary unification, which was perceived as an increase in the exposure 
to the competitive risk or a loss of the national capacities for protection such.
For instance, the implementation of the European directive on capital mobility (1988) was i
part a concession to Germany: 
“In the summer of 1988, we have let it clearly known to the Commission and other European 
countries that Germany would never accept a
external capital mobility” (Hans Ti
The categories the most threatened by the crisis perceived the European integration as an additional 
threat, the other categories as an opportu
“French top managers are pro
return to order and the ‘marketisation’ of the French economy
achieved through Europe, thanks to Europe and because of Europe”. Pasc
Débat, p.35 (our translation and emphasis).
Besides, the reform of the social protection system in 1995 was presented by Prime Minister 
A. Juppé himself as an obligation to reduce public deficits because of the requirements imposed by 
the European monetary unification.
social security, A. Juppé stated: 
he social-democratic institutions in large part inherited from 
middle classes and the bureaucracy 
 
 monetary union without complete internal and 
tmeyer, cited in Abdelal 2007). 
nity. 
-Europe because they have, quite rightly, understood that the 
, if I may say so, have been 
 
 On 15 November 1995, on the declaration on the reform plan for 
27 
 
 
constraints: (i) the 
n 
al Lamy 2005, Le 
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“One must break with the policies that have for 15 years let deficits increase and led to an 
unprecedented rise in real interest rates. Our policy precisely consists in reversing this 
evolution, which has gone on for too long. It breaks with fiscal complacency and drastically and 
lastingly reduces deficits. It creates the conditions of a new monetary policy which, in the 
perspective of the unique European currency, enables the French economy to breathe and 
develop. Let me remind you that a 1-point drop in interest rates injects 50 billion Francs in 
economic circuits. This is also why one must achieve social budget balance. This is a 
prerequisite toward the development of employment.” (our emphasis) 
The following year, on 2 October 1996, in his declaration of general policy on employment and 
modernization of democracy, the Prime Minister declared: 
“The third instrument in this policy of recovery of our public finance [is]: the stability of 
currency that leads to the decrease in interest rates. (…) This way is made credible the 
progression toward the unique currency which has recently made some progress in Dublin, 
notably with the setting up of a European monetary system for the countries which will not 
adopt the unique currency right away. There is there (…) not only a technical and, if I may say 
so, economic ambition, but much more a real political project which is the only one able to 
reinforce the European Union at a time when it will be enlarged and in a world that is 
organizing itself. And I say it to all those who are overcome by a bit of euroscepticism when 
North America is making the ALENA, South America the MERCOSUR, and Asia the ASEAN, are 
we, the European Union, going to split or be more fragile. The economic and monetary union, 
the unique European currency, will be, I am convinced of it, the locomotive of this Europe that 
we need in the emerging 21st century world.”  (our emphasis) 
This European dimension led to a difference of appreciation across the two blocs (Grunberg 
and Schweisguth 1997; Guillaud and Palombarini 2006). Voters on the right the most opposed to 
European integration were those who expressed most strongly expectations in terms of ‘internal’ 
liberalization (and protection vis-à-vis the rest of the world): no creation of public jobs or increase in 
the minimum wage, more privatisations. To the left on the other hand, the voters demanding the 
most a corrective intervention from the State were also those who expressed the most negative 
judgments on European integration. In 1995, 46.2% of the persons surveyed in the panel électoral 
considered that France has ‘many’ or ‘sufficiently many’ common interests with other countries in 
Europe. This percentage was 52% among managers and employees of public sector, but only 38% 
among workers. Similarly, 29% of the respondents felt ‘just French’ and not European, a feeling 
shared by 19.3% of the executives and public sector employees only, but by 35.7% of the workers. 
The panel électoral of 1997 reveals a strong difference of opinion regarding the European 
Union across core groups of the left bloc. Asked what they would feel if the European Union were 
abandoned, only one third of the workers would be sorry whereas this feeling would be shared by 
three quarters of the medium- and high-skilled civil servants (Table 5). 
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Table 5. France: answers to the question: “If you were told tomorrow that the European Union is 
abandoned, would you be…”. 
 Workers High-level employees of the 
public sector and intellectual 
professions 
 percentage Cum. 
Percent. 
percentage Cum. 
Percent. 
Very sorry 33.0 33.0 76.3 76.3 
Indifferent 40.4 73.5 18.7 95.00 
Very relieved 26.5 100.0 5.0 100.0 
Source of data: panel électoral français 1997. 
This evolution was confirmed during the 2000s and peaked during the referendum of 2005 
on the European constitutional treaty. The negative votes outnumbered the positive ones in the 
fraction of the left bloc which had a negative vision of globalization and the single currency, and in 
that of the right bloc which expected a more liberal policy on the internal side (privatization, reduced 
taxes, decrease in the number of civil servants) while wishing a certain protection against the outside 
(distrust towards the single currency). It may be recalled that the Socialist Party officially decided in 
favour of the European constitution at the 2005 referendum following a relatively narrow victory of 
that option in an internal vote. However, a majority of left voters chose the opposite option and 
workers, according to an IPSOS poll, voted ‘No’ with a large majority of 79%.  
The positive judgments on the European integration can thus be found with voters of the 
traditional parties, which gather the high- and middle-income categories of the private sector 
(foremen, employees, junior and senior executives) liberal professions and agricultural world for the 
right, the high- and middle-income categories of the public sector for the left. On the other hand, all 
the categories with low-income and/or which feel threatened in their status drifted away from 
traditional parties: storekeepers and craftsmen in the right bloc, workers in the left bloc. 
The recomposing of the left bloc supposes to reduce the social rift about European 
integration, which has led to the drift of a large part of the popular classes away from government 
parties towards abstention or extremes on the left or on the right. This implies that European 
integration should no longer be perceived as a Trojan horse for neo-liberalism by this fraction of the 
electorate. It is to a small extent an ideological problem which is partly the consequence of French 
political leaders’ use of European integration in their discourse when they want to implement an 
unpopular reform. But this reject of European integration is far more significantly a reject of actual 
European policies and the reality of European integration, particularly that at the initiative of the 
European Commission. The recomposing of the left bloc implies therefore a radical change in the 
European public policies. One imagines with difficulty that such a change could be made without a 
substantial altering of the rules of European integration: the objectives and statutes of the ECB, the 
unanimity rule, in fiscal matters particularly, etc. 
If the heart of the fracture of the left bloc is indeed the too liberal orientation of the 
European unification, only a sensitive reorientation of the European policies may bring a solution. 
Jospin, who was Prime Minister between 1997 and 2002 and whose political career suffered from the 
break-up of the left bloc at the 2002 presidential election, was conscious of the difficulties that the 
European Union implied for the definition of a left-wing policy: 
“The reluctance of the public opinion was measured in the extremely tight vote approving the 
Maastricht treaty and in the rejection of the constitutional treaty in 2005. But this reluctance 
and this scepticism concern less the merits or the defects of the texts which were subject to 
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the European peoples’ vote than a deeper conclusion: Europe has been for twenty years a 
zone of low growth, it was not able to prevent the rise of unemployment, it encouraged little 
social progress, it was passive in front of disorders of globalization. […] Questioning the 
European project – which would be madness – is out of the question, but there is a very 
serious need to revise its contents.” (Jospin 2010: 255, our translation). 
In the current configuration of the Union with 27 countries, this seems impracticable.  
“As Prime Minister, I did not question the principle of the independence of the European 
Central Bank. I could not do it. This principle resulted from the treaty of Maastricht approved in 
France by the referendum of 1992 and ratified by all the European States. On the other hand, I 
have never believed that the independence of the central Bank could be a guarantee of good 
management. […] The problem is not to question the independence of the central Bank – it 
would be necessary for it to obtain the unanimity in Europe – it is necessary to see to it that 
the governments […] and the European Central Bank […] have a real dialogue to lead 
coherently the economic and monetary policy of the Union.” (Jospin 2010: 254-255, our 
emphasis). 
What is left to the traditional left parties is merely to bemoan the state of the world:  
“The assertiveness of Europe as an economic and political community is for me one of the 
most innovative and the most fertile facts of the 20th century. Naturally, I regretted the too 
liberal course of the European construction, but I did not use it as a pretext to turn my back to 
the project itself.” (Jospin 2010: 253). 
But the partly neo-liberal choice made by a fraction of the PS may be at the heart of the 
divisions of the left bloc rather than the European Union issue itself. As mentioned before, the ‘turn 
of the rigour’ made in 1983-1984 was a political and economic choice to keep on with European 
economic unification and renew the social base of the left. The quest of a centre-PS alliance and the 
incompatibility of this project with the maintaining of the traditional alliance has been a permanent 
source of difficulties for the PS since 1984. The contradictions between the nature of the structural 
reforms made under the PS-led governments and the expectations of the less affluent part of the 
social base of the left have each time provoked the electoral defeat of the PS because of the non-
existence of a replacement social base, which would for instance be composed with pro-Europe and 
mildly neo-liberal middle classes. 
The strategy followed by PS leaders since the mid-1980s is therefore to renew their social 
base by neo-liberalisation of the French economic model which would not concern primarily the 
institutions the most important for the traditional social base of the left and probably also for a 
significant fraction of the middle classes: labour market institutions and social protection. This 
concern about the middle class is expressed for instance by the former finance minister of L. Jospin, 
D. Strauss-Kahn. According to him, the middle class forms the base of democracy, contrasting with 
the temptation of violence that would inhabit the poor (Strauss-Kahn 2002). 
But the neglect of the demands of the working class can only be a viable political option if the 
popular classes, disappointed by the left, choose not to vote, which is what Strauss-Kahn assumes, or 
vote nevertheless for the left parties in a logic similar to that of the median-voter model. This latter 
possibility is what Jospin thought more realistic when he declared that the social base of the left had 
been extended (towards the centre).25 The possibility that the working class could vote for other 
parties than the PS or the left was not considered as a possibility. Yet, as shown in the analysis of the 
                                               
25
 “Our sociological base is neither homogeneous nor narrow; it has been renewed and extended. This is why we must find 
the best trade-off between social classes. Those who are rather satisfied with the current state of society and do not want to 
incur the ‘cost’ of increasing equality [and] [t]hose for which the notion of equality and its concrete deepening are 
fundamental.” Jospin 1999: 50 (our translation). 
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2007 electoral survey, the core groups of the left are now mostly skilled middle classes (groups 4, 6, 8 
and 10 in the latent class analysis presented in the Appendix). Workers are on the other hand 
scattered in different groups, expressing demands for income redistribution and protection that the 
left has somewhat neglected, leading to an increased volatility of the working class vote, a 
phenomenon observed also in other European countries (Thomassen 2005). 
5. Neo-liberal reforms as a strategy towards a new dominant social bloc 
a. Berlusconi: a new compromise between rent and profit 
Berlusconi won the legislative election of 2008. According to ITANES (2008), as in previous 
elections, the electoral core of the right comprised the entrepreneurs and the self-employed. The 
electoral core of the left included the intellectual professions and civil servants. Again, as in previous 
elections, voters belonging to the popular classes were the most mobile and determined the 
outcome of the election:  
“The behaviour the most difficult to interpret is that of the least skilled workers. Their 
participation in voting is almost identical to that of the general population. […] It is a 
composite class – the ‘traditional’ workers, the unskilled service sector employees, workers 
without open-end contracts – which represents half of the electorate […].Voters impoverished 
and troubled, uncertain and suspicious, waiting for answers to their problems. This class in the 
2006-2008 transition has considerably shifted its votes from the centre-left and radical left 
(which lost 12%) to the centre-right Northern League and the PDL (which gained 11%). This 
class represents in 2008 half of the electorate of the PD, of the PDL and of the Northern 
League.” (ITANES 2008: 95-96). 
The results of a latent class analysis performed on the 2008 electoral survey lead to 
conclusions very close to the interpretation found in ITANES (2008). Table 6 presents a summary of 
the results, with 7 classes of voters. 
Table 6. Italy: results of the latent class analysis on the 2008 electoral survey. 
Class Weight Social demands Vote 
Fragile popular classes 
(precarious employment), not 
covered by labour law 
24% Pessimistic about economic 
developments; primary 
concern: work, job insecurity 
Weak link to the right 
(self-positioning), vote 
for a protecting right; 
southern regions 
Inactive (housewives, 
unemployed, leave work), poor 
self-employed 
22% Very pessimistic about 
economic developments; 
primary concern: work, 
employment, job insecurity, 
economic insecurity 
Rather weak link to 
the right (self-
positioning), vote for 
the liberal right 
Teachers, employees, medium-
rank executives, students and 
intellectual professions 
17% Main concern: economic 
growth, labour, employment, 
job insecurity 
Strong link with the 
left 
Self-employed, Entrepreneurs, 
professionals 
14% 72% agree with the freedom 
to dismiss; primary concern: 
growth, crime 
Strong link with the 
right, massive vote for 
the liberal right, small 
business areas 
Teachers, executives 9% Main concern: work, 
economic insecurity + 
Very strong link with 
the left ; red regions 
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 Employees of cooperatives, 
seeking a first job, clerks 
Inactive, retired 
One must first note that workers do not appear in any class in particular. Again, ITANES 
(2008) confirms this finding: workers’ share in the whole electorate is 23%; its share in the electorate 
of the PD is 25.3%, 23% in the PDL electorate and 25.4% in the Northern League’s electorate. Thus 
workers are more or less randomly distributed across 
factors may be mentioned. 
- PD's refusal of an alliance with the radical left; break
Comunista, the only party with which the workers kept a privileged relationship. 
- The working class was highly penalised by the economic policy implemented since 1990 
(both under the centre-left and centre
- The working class is divided among at least three segments: (1) workers in large firms 
(northwest), unionized and protected by the status of workers; (2) workers in small 
enterprises (north-east and centre), which from the point of view of political behaviour are in 
line with their employers, and (3) precarious or irregular workers (centre, s
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 Figure 14. Change in gross wages 1993
A) The electoral core of the right corresponds to the third class (Independent, entrepreneurs, 
professionals). They have rather 
this level, there is a compromise between financial rent and SME’s interests: they want a 
liberalisation of the labour market, and real wages as an adjustment variable (
Solari 2011). The problem of Berlusconi is to open a new space of mediation between profit 
and rent without financial power play on the public debt. The answer he has chosen is 
simple:  the adjustment takes place on the labour market through a downward flexibility of 
the real wage and a dismantling of the workers’ status and the associated employment 
protections.  
B) The profit/rent compromise formed the base of the electoral core of the right, but this is not 
enough to win the election. Berlusconi need to build a second level
electoral core and classes (1) and (2): workers who are vulnerable, insecure, unemployed, 
present mainly in the South. The fundamental expectation of these classes is economic 
growth. They are not particularly concerned with employm
bargained wage increases. These vulnerable workers play the role that the assisted classes 
had in the 1980s, when financial transfers to the south of the country were necessary to 
compensate for the high unemployment rate and ec
1990s, there was a drastic slashing of these transfer payments, but no catching up of the 
South and unemployment is still at very high level. The outcome is a strong diffusion of 
economic insecurity (temporary, irregula
May the liberal policy that ensures the viability of the compromise at the first level (within the 
electoral core of the right) also be an effective mediation for the second level compromise (between 
the electoral core and precarious classes
Berlusconi has been trying since the 1990s to stabilise a compromise between the liberal 
core of his electoral base - located in Northern industrialized regions, particularly in the North East, 
which is characterized by a high density of SMEs 
located in the South (Pisati 2010) 
the difficulty to find a political mediation between demands stemming from extremely 
heterogeneous territories (Figure 15)
North-Centre level. In 2008, the unemployment rate in the South in 2009 was above 12% against a 
national average of 7.8%. The labour market participation rate for the population aged 15 to 64 was
67.6% in the Northeast, 66% in the North
-2007. Source: Ires-Cgil, Ocde. 
high incomes and express demands for a liberal policy. At 
 compromise between his 
ent protection or centrally 
onomic backwardness. Since the early 
r work, etc.)  
)?   
- and the precarious classes, for the most part 
. But this compromise is fragile for structural reasons, because of 
. GDP per capita in the Southern regions is below 60% of the 
-West, 62.3% in Centre and only 46.5% in the South. In this 
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 latter region, over 20% of employed workers do not have an open
10% in the Centre/North regions (
The image of jobs without security being occupied by graduate students looking for a first 
contact with the labour market may be very popular in Italy but is totally false. In 2009, in a total of 
3 751 000 workers without stable contracts, almost half (exac
first level of secondary school. Among precarious workers, only 16% have a university degree at the 
bachelor level.26 
Figure 15. Relative GDP per capita in the South (w.r.t. the Centre/North), 1860
Pigliaru (2009). 
In his first election victory in 1994, Berlusconi was allied
and to the National Alliance party in the South (AN), but the League and AN
Instead, the League called for a reduction 
federalism; AN accused the League of trying to sabotage national unity. AN requested the extension 
of financial transfers to the South
shed its ‘fascist’ legacy. The League was present exclusively in the North; National Alliance was 
primarily rooted in the South. Nine months after the election victory, the Northern League al
the government, resulting in the fall of the first Berlusconi government. Tensions between the two 
wings of the right-wing alliance occurred again during the second Berlusconi government. In 2004, 
Fini (leader of AN) obtained the resignation of the
too attentive to the needs of the League and not sufficiently attentive to the demand of economic 
development from the South. The same conflict took place again in 2010 under the third Berlusconi 
government. Meanwhile, AN merged with Berlusconi's party (Forza Italia) in the 
(PDL). The dissatisfaction of some of the former AN particularly given the lack of a recovery plan after 
the financial crisis led to a split in the PDL and a new party cr
is now in the opposition to the Berlusconi government. 
It should be noted that the Great Recession has hit Southern Italy harder than the rest of the 
country: in 2009, employment was down 4.1% in the south against
It is clear that the absence of a recovery plan has mainly penalized precarious and assisted classes in 
the South, which explains the defection of Fini.  
The situation can be analysed as follows. The crisis forced Berl
strategies. Either (a) reactivate a state transfer and demand support policy to protect the most 
                                               
26
 Source: Ufficio Studi Cgia, Mestre. 
-end contract, against less than 
Source: Banca d'Italia). 
tly 45.5% of the total) had left after the 
 to the Northern League in the N
 did not
of taxes for the 'productive' classes of the North and 
; the League accused AN of being a centralist party which had not 
 Minister of Economy Giulio Tremonti, regarded as 
eated by Fini (‘Futuro e Libertà’), which 
 
 a decline of 0.6% in North Central. 
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 vulnerable group of the electorate, with the risk of tarnishing his image as a liberal reformer and 
disappoint its ‘liberal’ electoral base, or (b) give priority to the control of public finances. He opted 
for the second strategy. This move reinforced the first level compromise; it consolidated the core of 
its social base, but implied a risk, at least in the short
strengthened the links between the Northern League and Berlusconi (Tremonti’s strategy) but it also 
entailed difficulties with the former National Alliance.
The strategic choice of Berlusconi, very different and in fact almost oppos
Sarkozy, explains the extreme weakness of the recovery plan presented by the Italian Government in 
the 2008 Finance Act (Figure 16) and the unexpected turn of the Minister of Economy. Giulio 
Tremonti, who has been selected for this position 
strongly to the rigour imposed by Brussels in the mid
he was among the few to anticipate, he became the guardian of budgetary orthodoxy. 
Figure 16. Anti-crisis plans in % of GDP 2009
The choice of austerity to face the Great Recession left the Italian government with a single 
tool to cope with the recession: a drastic decrease in labour costs, which should lead the end of the 
national contract and the dismantling of the welfare system.
Fiat - by far the largest company in the country 
Fiat has for a long time benefited from significant and varied government support in terms of 
public procurement, support for restructuring, 
retirement, tax concessions and so on. This has created a special relationship between Fiat and the 
various Italian governments, with the implicit exchange between on the one hand policy measures 
benefitting the company and on the other hand a commitment from the firm to give priority to 
development on the national territory. Gianni Agnelli, the leader and largest shareholder of Fiat for 
almost 40 years, who died in 2003, had several times had the opportu
“genetically pro-government” and that “what is good for Fiat is good for Italy”. One might also 
remember that the President of Confindustria (the Italian employers’ association) from the post
period until 2008 had been ‘elected’ after having been chosen by Fiat, with the exception of Antonio 
D' Amato (Chairman den 2000 and 2004).
With the designation of Sergio Marchionne as CEO and the acquisition of / merger with 
Chrysler, Fiat radically changed its strategy. Fiat became a
several brains, some of them abroad” (Marchionne, hearing in the House of Representatives, 15 
February 2011). The internationalization strategy implies that production may partly remain in Italy 
only on the condition that productivity there should be at least as high as in other production units: 
-term, for the second level compromise.  It 
 
in all three Berlusconi governments, had objected 
-1990s / early 2000s. In the presence of a crisis 
-2010. Source: Ires-Cgil, IMF.
 In this respect, the strategy chosen by 
- is very significant.   
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for example Marchionne declared recently that “the Tychy plant in Poland by itself produces more 
benefits than the five Italian factories together. Fiat would work better if it left Italy” (TV interview to 
Rai3, 24 October 2010). The increase in productivity should be achieved at the cost of greater 
flexibility and lower cost of labour. This is the direction taken after the plant agreements voted in 
Pomigliano d'Arco (June 2010) and Mirafiori (January 2011). Beyond the deterioration of working 
conditions and new rules on the presence of trade unions in the firm involved in these agreements, 
the remarkable point is that they have been signed outside of the national bargaining framework.  
Therefore the agreements of Pomigliano and Mirafiori mark a major turning point in the 
model of industrial relations in Italy. Emma Marcegaglia, president of Confindustria, was indeed 
initially opposed to the new strategy of Fiat. But following the outcome of the referendum at 
Mirafiori which validated (with a very narrow majority) the agreement, she finally admitted: “Until 
now, the logic was that the same policy should be applied to everyone. Today things are different. 
[...]. In the future there will still be cases such as Mirafiori, but some firms will also refer to a national 
contract, although probably less binding. [...] Each company should be free to choose the model of 
labour relations appropriate to its competitiveness: a greater flexibility is needed because the world 
has changed” (TV interview of 23 January 2011).  
This shows that the inaction of the government following the crisis has laid the groundwork 
for a neoliberal initiative in the field of labour relations, without explicit intervention or risk-taking by 
the government. The government has limited its intervention to publicly support the actions of 
Marchionne. On 29 October 2010 in Brussels, Berlusconi declared for example: “When [Marchionne] 
said that Fiat would work better if it left Italy, he told the truth. (...). Today Fiat has to manage 
factories with excessive costs and unions that limit their action. In countries like China or India labour 
is cheaper and less subject to union leadership. And they work up to twelve hours a day.” Therefore, 
according to Berlusconi, “Marchionne must be thanked if he decides to stay in Italy.” 
Faced with the Great Recession, Berlusconi decided to focus on expectations of the liberal 
hard core of its social base and to strengthen the alliance between profit and rent based on labour 
market’s liberalisation. It remains to be checked whether this strategy will allow him to keep the 
support of the precarious and fragile classes. Presumably the effects on growth of liberal reforms will 
be crucial for the renewal of what we have called the ‘second level compromise’. 
b. The economic crisis is a problem for Sarkozy’s strategy 
As mentioned before, the two social alliances which structured the French political life under 
the 5th Republic gradually decomposed during the 1990s. On the right side, there is a contradiction 
between the expectations of neo-liberalisation of the economy borne by the independents and the 
fears that drastic alterations of the French model in the areas of the labour market and social 
protection would lead to an increased insecurity of their situation expressed by the employees of the 
private sector. Ever since the failure of the 1986-1988 experience emulating the Anglo-Saxon 
“conservative revolution”, the right-wing RPR-UDF/UMP governments have tried to find a 
compromise between the divergent expectations of their social base. The second Chirac presidency 
marked the limits of this exercise, with a part of the social base as well as the government party 
expressing discontent against the alleged “immobility” of Chirac or its lack of “political courage” in 
the affair of the CPE labour contract. Following a massive wave of protest, the law instituting this 
contract with diminished social rights was promulgated and abolished at the same time. Sarkozy’s 
solution was not to propose a return to Thatcherite neo-liberalisation but to propose a new 
compromise between the divergent interests of the right bloc.  
A stable reunification of the right bloc demands that a solution be found to the contradiction 
between the demands for flexibility and neo-liberal reforms expressed by the independents and the 
demands for protection expressed by private sector employees (Table 7). Also, as seen before, a part 
of the popular classes were dissatisfied with the left government parties but still expressed demands 
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towards income redistribution and an increase in purchasing power (see the latent class analysis 
results in the Appendix). N. Sarkozy’s search of a mediation led him to follow two directions. The first 
one is the promise of a possible rise in purchasing power by an increase of the labour supply; “to 
work more in order to earn more” was one of Sarkozy’s campaign slogans. This took the form of a 
drop in taxes for overtime earnings and an easing of the regulation on overtime work. This had the 
advantage of emptying the 35-hour week regulation of its most social content contents without 
actually abolishing it,27 while at the same time keeping and even extending the work organisation 
flexibility measures which had been part of the quid pro quo between the government and the trade 
unions at the time of the 35-hour law. The second direction was the assurance that the way followed 
for the flexibilisation of the labour market would be a French-style flexicurity and not pure and 
simple Anglo-Saxon style flexibility. To sum up, Sarkozy’s project was some type of kinder, gentler 
neo-liberalisation or as the main campaign slogan had it, a ‘rupture tranquille’. 
If that was sufficient to win the presidential election and the parliament election which 
followed, it was not enough to solve the contradictions between a neo-liberal transformation project 
of the French model and the realities of its Continental European institutions. Furthermore, the 
space for mediation between the neoliberal expectations and the demands for security shrunk 
drastically with the financial and economic crisis of 2008.  
The program implemented by Sarkozy fell short of satisfying the right’s neoliberal wing, 
which wanted a drastic deregulation of the labour market. Neither the lightening of taxes on extra-
hours nor the pseudo-flexicurity seems to please neo-liberal economists Cahuc and Zylberberg (2009) 
for instance:  
“By exempting overtime work from taxation and by making more flexible the regulations of the 
work day, the government managed to invent the machine to win more by working the same 
amount. Far from establishing a culture of work, the lifting of taxes on overtime work 
facilitates fiscal opportunism, because one has the possibility of paying less tax by exploiting 
the defaults of a badly conceived regulation.” (Cahuc and Zylberberg 2009: 164).  
Regarding employment legislation, the neoliberal ideal would be a unique labour contract with very 
limited protection, abolishing the distinction between regular and atypical work contracts. Here too, 
Sarkozy disappoints Cahuc and Zylberberg (2009):  
“The law of modernization of the labour market [...] is supposed to set up the professional 
Social Security. The reality is very different. This law is not the proof of the success of Nicolas 
Sarkozy's method, but well and truly that of its failure. Left free to negotiate without precise 
directives, labour unions got on a minimal agreement reflecting the interests of those that 
they represent above all, namely the skilled and senior employees and the companies which 
employ them. In reality, the only noteworthy effect of the law of modernization of the labour 
market is to open the way for retirement at 57.” (Cahuc and Zylberberg 2009: 29-30).  
“The ‘French-style flexicurity’ is reduced to the birth of the conventional breach [of the 
employment contract] which will make retirement easier at the expense of the ASSEDIC 
[Organizations managing unemployment insurance payments] and to pointlessly lengthen the 
periods of unemployment of some highly skilled executives, at the expense of the ASSEDIC 
again. (…). At no time, did the government clearly address the core of the problem, namely the 
absurd functioning of the labour market due to our redundancy law. At no time did it ask the 
social partners to modify the definition of the redundancy.” (Cahuc and Zylberberg 2009: 51, 
our emphasis). 
                                               
27
 The 35-hour week was considered positively by most social groups. Also, the flexibilisation side of the 35-hour week law 
is most appreciated by business interests. 
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The attempt to reconcile the contradictory expectations of the independents, who demand a 
strong liberalisation of the labour market, and private sector employees, which expect to keep a 
reasonably high level of social protection and/or employment protection, explains the apparently 
schizophrenic character of Sarkozy’s discourse. He who took pride in being nicknamed Sarkozy 
l´américain because of its often-expressed naïve admiration of the US model of capitalism, who 
wanted to generalise asset-based credit for home acquisition and introduce a French-style subprime 
market (Convention pour la France d’après, Paris, 14 September 2006) and was more generally 
favourable to France emulating the Anglo-Saxon model as late as December 200728, veered toward 
the German model in March 2008 (“we are going to do everything the way you did it, and that is true 
friendship”, 3 March 2008), reverted back to Great Britain later the same month (“the UK has shown 
that there was a way in the global economy to reach a strong growth, full employment and 
solidarity... What is at stake for us is to take inspiration from the lessons of a successful experience, 
your experience”, 26 March 2008).  
Six months later, the financial and economic crisis led to another turnaround: “Self-
regulation to solve all problems, this is over. Laissez-faire, this is over. The almighty market which is 
always right, this is over” (Discours Toulon 29 September 2008). And in front of the students of 
Columbia University, he is even sarcastic when mentioning Obama’s welfare reform and the 
difficulties that the US President had to face: “welcome to the club of countries which do not leave 
their poor in the lurch [...] As for the idea that the poor should not be left alone and penniless in the 
streets, I am sorry but we solved the problem fifty years ago [...] If you come to France and 
something happens to you in the streets, you will not be asked to show your credit card before being 
admitted in a hospital.” (Columbia University, 29 March 2010). 
But if the financial crisis and the economic slowdown that followed gave a new lustre to the 
French model of capitalism and its social system, it was also the final nail in the French flexicurity’s 
coffin. At the time when the economic slowdown led to a rise of unemployment (Figure 10), the 
French labour market’s “rigidity” was perceived as an advantage rather than a drawback: ‘the French 
model resists better in times of crisis’ admitted OECD’s General Secretary (Gurria 2009). 
But the most serious problem results from the consequences of the crisis in terms of 
unemployment and public finance, following the growth slowdown. The long-term stability of a 
system of flexicurity requires that time spent in unemployment be short, with a generous 
compensation and an effective training for the unemployed. The economic crisis will have for 
consequence to make unemployment spells more frequent and longer than before. Moreover, 
because of the expectations of some groups within the right bloc, Sarkozy could not afford to ignore 
the demand for an expansionary policy and a financial system rescue plan, contrary to Berlusconi in 
Italy. France’s reaction to the crisis has therefore been much more substantial than in Italy (Figure 
16). 
Slow growth, tax cuts and public expenditure in reaction to the crisis imply a growing public 
finance problem (Figure 17). This growth of the public debt is both a threat and an opportunity. It is a 
threat to the stability of the right bloc because it makes the security side of the flexicurity strategy 
financially unsustainable. It also implies a limitation to further demand-sustaining budget policy 
which could have for consequence to make the situation of a part of the broad group of private 
sector employees more fragile. It is also an opportunity for the pursuit of neo-liberal structural 
reforms since it enables the exploitation of a ‘shock strategy’: the financial situation allegedly makes 
welfare state retrenchment inevitable. However, this means that the financial crisis is at the heart of 
the problems behind the rift in the right bloc. The crisis has little consequences for the neo-liberal 
                                               
28
 “But one must note that some governments succeed in obtaining for their country a higher growth in the long run… What 
[the UK] has done, why should we not do it? What the English socialists understood, the French right could implement it.” 
N. Sarkozy, Discours de M. le Président de la République devant l’Assemblée des Entrepreneurs CGPME Lyon – Palais des 
Congrès, 7 December 2007 (our translation). 
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 core of the right bloc and will most likely push these groups towards more pressing demands for 
structural reforms and welfare retrenchment. The crisis is also making the situation of most private 
sector employees more precarious, leading them to oppo
reforms. 
Figure 17. Gross public debt as a percentage of GDP, France.
In the absence of a very expansionary macroeconomic policy at the EU level, only a drastic 
decrease of the public spending on other posts than those related to the flexicurity strategy could 
make the way out of the public finance problem possible. But this
economic and for political reasons. Part of Sarkozy’s program was indeed to cut public employment, 
a move with limited political costs considering that civil servants are mostly outside of the right bloc. 
But realistic public employment cut will not provide the amount of resources necessary to the 
implementation of the security part of the flexicurity strategy. The flexicurity solution besides the 
fact that it may not produce the expected positive economic effects (Amable 20
an illusion, leaving the choice between the pure and simple flexibility at the risk of losing the 
employees of the private sector or the security at the risk of alienating the craftsmen and the 
storekeepers. 
  
se too drastic neo
 
 remains quite unlikely both for 
09) may thus be only 
39 
-liberal structural 
 
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2011.51
40 
 
Table 7. France: social groups in 2007. 
Class Weight Expectations Vote 
Workers : 33%; Clerks: 22%; 
Intermediate level employees: 
20% 
20% Most important problems: 1. 
Unemployment; 2. Purchasing power. 
Favourable to income redistribution 
Centre-left 
PS 
Independents and high-level 
executives: 42%; Intermediate 
level employees: 25% 
13% Most important problems: 1. Education and 
training; 2. Environment and global warming. 
Favourable to neo-liberal reforms 
Right  UMP 
Workers: 38%; Clerks: 19%; 
Farmers: 4.4% 
13% Most important problems: 1. Immigration; 
social inequality; 2. Unemployment. 
Favourable to income redistribution 
Right  
UMP / PS 
Executives and intermediary 
level executives: 49%; 
Inactive: 10% 
9% Most important problems : 1. Social 
inequalities; 2. Education and youth training  
Left  
PS 
Workers: 33%; Clerks: 24%; 
Inactive: 8% 
9% Most important problems: 1. Purchasing 
power; 2. Unemployment 
Centre-left 
PS 
Executive and intermediate 
level employees: 52%; 
Workers: 21% 
9% Most important problems: 1. Education and 
youth training; 2. Social inequality. 
Favourable to income redistribution 
Left  
PS 
Professionals and 
independents: 74% 
6% Most important problems: 1. 
Unemployment; 2. Purchasing power. 
Favourable to neo-liberal reforms 
Right 
UMP 
Workers and clerks: 40%; 
Intermediate-level employees 
and executives: 48% 
5% Most important problems: 1. Social 
inequality; 2. Unemployment. Favourable to 
income redistribution 
Left / far left 
PS / PCF 
Workers and foremen: 56% 5% Most important problems: 1. 
Unemployment; 2. Crime 
Right / far 
right 
UMP/PS/FN 
Executives and intellectual 
professions: 31%; Health and 
social sector employees: 19%  
4% Most important problems: 1. Social 
inequality; 2. Education and youth training 
Left / far left 
PS/PCF/NPA 
Workers and clerks: 74%; 
Women: 63% 
3% Most important problems: 1. 
Unemployment; 2. Purchasing power. 
Favourable to income redistribution 
Centre-left 
PS 
Workers: 52% 3% Most important problems: 1. 
Unemployment; 2. Immigration 
Centre-left / 
far right 
PS 
Source: panel électoral français 2007 (see the latent class analysis detailed in the Appendix). 
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6. Conclusion 
In spite of apparent similarities, the analysis of the neo-liberal strategies in France and Italy 
reveal significant differences. The social bloc strictly in favour of neo-liberal reforms is a minority in 
each country. It has nevertheless a stronger economic base in Italy because of the industrial structure 
of this country: a larger weight of independents and small firms (Figure 18). A neo-liberal strategy in 
Italy demands that the classes supporting the neo-liberal model elaborate an alliance with classes 
composed of fragile and precarious workers (‘outsiders’) whose main demand is towards growth and 
employment. A neo-liberal strategy in France demands that the private sector executives and the 
independents have an alliance with private sector employees, whose status is far more protected 
than that of Italian outsiders. French private sector workers will in any case oppose “pure” neo-
liberalism, i.e. reforms that would threaten their status. Hence the importance of the security side in 
the flexicurity strategy. 
As exposed above, the economic crisis makes this alliance increasingly difficult to hold. The 
situation is different in Italy. The crisis may be a problem for Berlusconi when the situation of the 
outsiders deteriorates drastically. However, the centre-left has no more credibility on this matter. 
This explains why the centre-left also tries to target the outsiders by following the footsteps of the 
French neo-liberal economists and proposing the adoption of the unique labour contract:29 a small 
improvement in employment protection at the cost of a loss of status for the core industry workers. 
The outcome may be a loss in electoral support. 
This contrasts with the possibilities open to the French left. Having disappointed the private 
sector employees both in terms of purchasing power and social protection, Sarkozy’s right has little 
left to offer as a substitute. On the other hand, the left could be credible in promising to maintain the 
level of social protection and hence hope to aggregate the groups composed with private sector 
workers to the core left group. However, this would demand a drastic turn in the socialist party’s 
policy, whose quest for a centre-left alliance for the past 25 years has been directed against an 
alliance with the working classes. 
Italy’s (lack of) reaction to the economic crisis with a substantial recovery plan also sets it 
apart from France. The recession is part of Berlusconi’s strategy of making the neo-liberal reforms 
‘indispensable’. It also satisfies the ‘Northern’ part of Berlusconi’s alliance, whose demands are 
towards restrictive macroeconomic policy. The situation is different for the Southern part of the 
alliance, and the recent conflict between Berlusconi and Fini may thus find an explanation based on 
Berlusconi’s choice of economic policy and, implicitly, of social groups to favour within his social 
base. 
The situation is different in France since Sarkozy was aware that the private sector 
employees were a crucial addition to the core right-wing neo-liberal groups. The modest results of 
the recovery plans forced Sarkozy to make a more drastic neo-liberal turn and use the worsening of 
the public finance as an excuse for pushing the pension reform on top of the political agenda. This 
strategy entails risks of losing a sizeable part of the private sector employee group, and particularly 
the workers.  The recent acceleration in Sarkozy’s loss of confidence among the electorate may be an 
illustration of the dangers of this strategy (Figure 19). 
                                               
29
 Here’s how you pass the ‘apartheid’ between protected and precarious. Pietro Ichino, L’Unita, 13 April 2010. 
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 Figure 18. Number of self
Figure 19. Opinion poll:  do you trust Nicolas Sarkozy to solve France’s current problems? 
June 2007-June 2010. Source: TNS
-employed (1000). 
-SOFRES. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Italy: important structural reforms. 
Area Government Reform 
Product 
market 
regulation 
 1991 Liberalisation of energy production 
 1992-2001 Privatisation of State holdings 
 1994 Creation of regulation authorities: energy, telecommunication, 
water 
 1998 Adaptation of railway activity to EU regulation; separation of 
infrastructures and services 
 2006 Deregulation of pharmacy, taxis, minimum fee for liberal 
professions… 
Social 
protection 
Amato 1992 First pension reform, increase in the contribution period, 
introduction of pension funds 
Dini 1995 Pensions from defined benefits system to defined contributions 
(Dini Law) 
Prodi 1997 Prodi law: tighter requirements for seniority pensions 
D’Alema 2000 Tax incentives for pension funds 
Financial 
sector 
 1986 Liberalisation of capital movements and exchange controls 
 1990 Privatisation of State-owned banks; foundations are created by 
separating the business from the charitable activity of local savings 
banks 
Amato 1992 Universal banking and de-specialisation of credit institutions is 
reintroduced; stock companies and cooperatives (including popular 
banks) are the only forms of banks allowed (public interest and savings 
banks disappear) 
 1993-1998 Privatisation of banks and transfer of local banks’ capital 
into foundations 
 1997 Favourable fiscal regime for stock options 
 1999 Privatisation of banks’ foundations 
 2009 In case of takeover bids, listed companies have to refrain from 
resisting the bid 
Labour 
market 
 1984 Cuts in the wage indexation mechanism (scala mobile). The law 
was preceded by a social pact which excluded the left-wing Union 
(CGIL), and by a government urgency decree 
 1987 Use of fixed-term employment contracts in permanent jobs is 
allowed 
 1992 Elimination of the wage indexation mechanism (scala mobile) 
 1993 Two wage bargaining levels: centralized for inflation forecast-
related increases and firm level for productivity-related increases 
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 1997 ‘Pacchetto Treu’ introduces temporary work, which was 
previously illegal; favours part-time working 
 2003 ‘Legge Maroni’ introduces new kinds of flexible labour contracts, 
with less workplace protection and reduced social security 
entitlements; interim employment agencies become employment 
agencies; abolishes L.1369/1960: interim labour becomes effective 
and also applied to permanent jobs (staff leasing); Co.co.co are 
replaced by ‘project contracts’ 
Prodi 2007 Permanent interim jobs are abolished, only fixed-time jobs are 
admitted (up to 12 months, extended to 36 maximum); call-up jobs 
are limited to tourism and few other cases 
Source:  Rangone and Solari (2011). 
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Table A2. France: important structural reforms. 
Area Government Reform 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Labour 
market 
Chirac  (RPR) 1986 .The administrative authorisation in case of individual 
dismissal for economic reasons is abolished. Administrative 
authorisation was previously required only for collective 
dismissals of more than 9 employees. 
1986. Introduction of “intermittent” work contracts (containing 
provisions for temporary interruptions of the work activity). 
Beregovoy 
(PS) 
1993. Statutory requirements are introduced concerning the 
contents of social plans. If there is no social plan or the 
measures proposed are inadequate, the redundancies will be 
considered invalid. 
Jospin (PS) 1998-2000. Aubry laws. 35-hour week for firms with more than 
20 employees and progressively extended to all firms. Working 
time computed on an annual basis (increased flexibility). Cuts in 
firms’ social contributions. 
2001 More flexible conditions for implementing the transition 
to the statutory 35-hour working week for companies with 
fewer than 20 employees. These companies will be able to use 
more overtime without having to give employees some time off 
in compensation 
 
 
Raffarin 
(UMP) 
2004. possibility to adapt or waive the stipulation of sector 
agreements on working hours to the specific needs of each 
business 
2005. Extension in time and scope of derogations to the 35-
hours working week 
Villepin 
(UMP) 
2005. New type of open-end contracts, CNE and CPE, 
respectively for new recruits in small firms up to 20 employees 
and workers under 26, allowing for easier firing (without reason 
or severance payment) within 2 years 
Fillon (UMP) 2007. Fiscal regime more favourable to extra-hours 
2008. extended possibilities for breaking up a work contract by 
mutual agreement 
2009. One stop job centre: Pôle Emploi 
 
 
 
 
Social 
protection 
Rocard (PS) 1988. Creation of the RMI (means-tested minimum allowance) 
for adults over 25 
Balladur 
(RPR) 
1993. Minimum contribution period to have a full pension 
extended from 37,5 to 40 years for private sector employees 
Juppé (RPR) 1995.Failed reform to extend to the public sector the 1993 
pension reform measures and to end the “special regimes” of 
social protection of the public sector 
Jospin (PS) 2001. tax credit or ‘negative taxation’ subsidising the pay of 
workers on low wage 
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Raffarin 
(UMP) 
2002. Reduction in the unemployment allowance duration 
2003. Convergence of private and public pension regimes. 
Foundations for a ‘third pillar’ 
Fillon (UMP) 2010. Pension reform. Legal (full) pension age set to 62 (67) 
years in 2018 instead of 60 (65). 
 
 
 
 
 
Product 
market 
regulation / 
privatisations 
 
Chirac (RPR) 
1986-1987. CGE (later Alcatel), Paribas, Saint-Gobain, Société 
Générale, Suez, CCF, TF1 (television), Matra, Havas, Mutuelle 
générale française, Banque du bâtiment et des travaux publics : 
between 70 and 100 billion FF 
Rocard (PS) 1990. Post and telecommunication split into two companies: La 
poste and France Telecom 
1991. Crédit local de France 
Balladur 
(RPR) 
1993-1995 Rhone-Poulenc, Elf Aquitaine, Renault (partly), UAP, 
Seita : 114 billion FF 
 
Juppé (RPR) 
1995-1997 AGF , GGM, Pechiney, Usinor-Sacilor, CFNR, BFCE, 
Bull: 40 billion FF 
1997: separation of railway infrastructures from services 
 
Jospin (PS) 
1997-2002. Air France (partly), motorways, Credit Lyonnais, 
france Telecom (partly), Eranet, GAN, Thomson multimedia, 
CIC, CNP, Aerospatiale (partly, later EADS): 214 billion FF 
Raffarin 
(UMP) 
2002-2005. France Telecom, Snecma, motorways13 billion Euro 
(85 billion FF) 
Villepin 
(UMP) 
2005-2006. motorways, EDF, GDF, SNCM 
Financial 
system - 
corporate 
governance 
Fabius (PS) 1984 Banking Act. Unified prudential rules for all financial 
institutions; the end of the division between commercial and 
investment banking. New banking supervisor. 
 
Beregovoy 
(PS) 
1985-1986. Deregulation of financial markets (money markets, 
futures...) 
1988-1989. adoption of the European directive on freedom of 
capital mobility 
Jospin (PS) 1998. detaxing of capital gains / stock-options 
2001 Law on New Economic Regulations: competition law, 
corporate governance and merger procedures 
Source: Amable, Guillaud and Palombarini (2011). 
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Latent Class analysis on the French pre- and post-electoral survey: panel électoral 2007 
Active variables: 
1. The unemployed could find a job (if they really wanted to) 
4 modalities of agreement/disagreement 
2. Most important problem at the time of voting 
List: environment and global warming; unemployment; immigration; social inequality; funding of 
social protection; crime; education and youth training; pensions; European integration; taxes; 
purchasing power; lodging; public debt and deficits 
3. Second most important problem 
Same list as above 
4 modalities of agreement/disagreement with the following statements 
4. One should increase the taxes for those with an income above 4000 Euros per month 
5. One should create a ministry for immigration and national identity 
6. One should compel firms that relocate their production abroad to reimburse state aids 
7. One should replace only 50% of the retiring civil servants 
8. The minimum wage should be raised to 1500 Euros per month as soon as possible 
Rather positive or rather negative impact on the following government actions on one’s personal 
situation: 
9. The decrease in income tax  
10. The pension reform  
11. The implementation of the CNE 
Agreement with the following measures (4 modalities of agreement/disagreement) 
12. A minimum service in public transports in case of strikes 
13. The suppression of the carte scolaire30 
14. Stronger penalties for recidivists 
15. Tougher conditions for already installed immigrants to bring their family to France 
16. Have a share of social protection’s funding assured by VAT (in lieu of social contributions) 
Agreement with the following statement 
17. The French society needs a radical change 
And the following question: 
18. Should priority be given to improving wage-earners’ condition or the economy’s 
competitiveness? 
                                               
30
 ‘Carte scolaire’ consists in a residence-based assignment of pupils to schools of the public sector. 
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 In order to have a better description of the classes, a certain number of inactive covariates were 
added to the analysis. 
Inactive variables: gender; age; education level; occupation; residence; opinion on various 
statements (reinstating the death penalty, there are too many immigrants in France ...), self
positioning on a left-right scale; propensity to take part in public demonstrations; judgment on 
French democracy; vote for the first round of the previous (2002) presidential election; vote fo
referendum on the European constitutional treaty (2005);  trust in the right or the left to govern 
France; presidential candidate proposing the best solutions; risk of being unemployed in the 
forthcoming months; preference for the majoritarian or the
judgment on the rhythm of the reforms; easy or difficult to live with the household’s income.
The choice of the number of classes was made by assessing the significance of adding an 
additional class to a given model wit
test). The analysis led to the selection of a 12
characteristics are given in what follows. 
Class 1  19.67% 
 Workers : 33%; Clerks: 22%; intermediate level employees: 20%
Education level: 60% have no end of secondary education degree
54% live in agglomerations under 20000 inhabitants
Most important problem: 1. Unemployment; 2. Purchasing power
Favourable to an increase in taxes for revenues over 4000 Euros per month (63%)
Favourable to a 50% replacement of retiring civil servants (72%)
Undecided about making it more difficult for immigrants already in France to bring his or her family
Vote in the first round of the 2002 pr
57% think they have some risk of being unemployed in the forthcoming months
Negative opinion on privatisations (65%)
Positive opinion on the 35-hour week (51%)
Preference for the proportional repres
Favourable to having left and right in the same government (75%)
Figure A1. Self-positioning on a left
Class2  13.42% 
Independents and high-level executives: 42%; intermediate level employees: 25%
 proportional representation system; 
h the conditional bootstrap (based on a difference log
-class model. The 12 classes and their main 
 
 
 
 
 
 
esidential election:  Jospin 24%, Chirac 16%, Le Pen 9.5%
 
 
 
entation system (71%) 
 
 
-right scale (histogram). 
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 Education level: 67% have end of secondary education degree or above
Most important problems: 1. Education and training; 2. environment and global warming 
61% think that unemployed could find a job (if they really wanted to)
Favourable to a 50% replacement of retir
Against a raise to 1500 Euros per month of the minimum wage (63%)
Priority should be given to improving French economy’s competitiveness (over improving wage
earners’ situation) 
Positive appreciation on the CNE
Favourable to the suppression of the 
Favourable to tougher constraints on the possibility for immigrants already in France to bring their 
family  
Favourable to a VAT-based financing of social protection
See themselves as rather right-wing (59%)
Consider that Sarkozy is the presidential candidate with the best solutions (40%)
Positive judgment on the functioning of democracy in France
Voted yes to the referendum on the European constitutional treaty (60%)
Voted for Chirac in the first round of the 2002 presiden
Positive judgment on privatisations (65%)
Positive judgment on the EU 
Easy to live with the household’s income 
Figure A2. Self-positioning on a left
Class 3  13.39% 
Workers 38%, clerks 19% farmers 4.4%
Most important problems: 1 immigration; social inequality; 2 unemployment
72% think that unemployed could find a job (if they really wanted to)
Favourable to an increase in taxes for revenues over 4000 Euros per month (63%)
Favourable to the creation of a mini
Favourable to a 50% replacement of retiring civil servants (57%)
 
 
ing civil servants (60%) 
 
 
carte scolaire 
 
 
 
 
 
tial election (41%)  
 
 
 
-right scale (histogram). 
 
 
 
stry for immigration and national identity (73%)
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 Favourable to tougher constraints on the possibility for immigrants already in France to bring their 
family 
Consider that Sarkozy is the presi
Favourable to reinstating the death penalty
Think that there are too many immigrants
Voted no to the referendum on the European constitutional treaty (44%) or abstained (18%)
Vote for the first round of the 2002 presidential election: Chirac 24%, Le Pen 16%
Negative judgment on privatisations
Prefer the proportional system 
Figure A3. Self-positioning on a left
Class 4  9.21% 
Executives and intermediary level executives 49%, inactive 10% 
Live in big cities or Paris (39%) 
Most important problems: 1 social inequalities
Weakly favourable to an increase in taxes for revenues over 4000 Euros per mo
Rather negative impact of the decrease in income tax
Against tougher constraints on the possibility for immigrants already in France to bring their family
See themselves as left-wing 
Vote for the first round of the 2002 presidential election: Jos
Negative judgment on privatisations
Positive judgment on the 35-hour week
Easy to live with the household’s income 
Prefer the proportional system 
Find the rhythm of the post-2007 reforms too fast
 
dential candidate with the best solutions (31%) 
 
 
 
 
-right scale (histogram). 
 
 ; 2 education and youth training  
nth (55%)
 
pin 36% 
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 Figure A4. Self-positioning on a left
Class 5  8.91% 
Workers 33%, clerks 24%, inactives 8% 
Women (62%) 
Age<50 (78%) 
Most important problems: 1 purchasing power; 2 unemployment
63% think that unemployed could find a job (if they really wanted to)
Favourable to an increase in taxes for revenues over 4000 Euros per month (66%)
Favourable to a 50% replacement of retiring civil servants (68%)
Vote for the first round of the 2002 presidential election: Jospin 25%; Chirac 20%
Some risk of being unemployed in the forthcoming months (57
Negative judgment on privatizations
Positive judgment on the 35-hour week
Prefer the proportional system 
Figure A5. Self-positioning on a left
Class 6  8.81% 
Executive and intermediate level employees (52%), workers 21%
Women (57%) 
Age<50 (78%) 
Most important problems: 1 education, youth training; 2 social inequality
 
-right scale (histogram). 
 
 
 
 
%) 
 
 
 
-right scale (histogram). 
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 Favourable to an increase in taxes for revenues over 4000 Euros per month (62%)
Against tougher penalties for recidivists
Against tougher constraints on the possib
See themselves as left-wing 
Vote for the first round of the 2002 presidential election: Jospin 30%; Besancenot 10%
Some risk of being unemployed in the forthcoming months (60%)
Negative judgment on privatizations
Positive judgment on the 35-hour week
Prefer the proportional system 
Figure A6. Self-positioning on a left
Class 7  5.72% 
Professionals and independents (74%)
Most important problems: 1 unemployment, 2 purchasin
72% think that unemployed could find a job (if they really wanted to)
Favourable to the creation of a ministry for immigration and national identity (82%)
Favourable to a 50% replacement of retiring civil servants (83%)
Against increase in taxes for revenues over 4000 Euros per month (78%)
Against an increase of the minimum wage to reach the level of 1500 Euros a month as soon as 
possible (59%) 
Priority should be given to improving French economy’s competitiveness (over improving wage
earners’ situation) 
Positive judgment on CNE 
Favourable to the suppression of the 
Favourable to tougher constraints on the possibility for immigrants already in France to bring their 
family 
Favourable to a VAT-based financing of social protection
See themselves as rather right-wing (59%)
Consider that Sarkozy is the presidential candidate with the best solutions (63%)
Positive judgment on the functioning of democracy in France
 
ility for immigrants already in France to bring their family
 
 
 
 
-right scale (histogram). 
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 Voted yes to the referendum on the European constitutional treaty (53%)
Think that there are too many immigrants in France
Vote for the first round of the 2002 presidential election: Chirac 53%; Le Pen 16.5%
Trust in the right-wing to govern France
Positive judgment on privatisations
Easy to live with the household’s income 
Figure A7. Self-positioning on a left
Class 8  5.44% 
Workers and clerks 40%, Intermediate
Most important problems: 1 social inequality; 2 unemployment
Favourable to an increase in taxes for revenues
Negative judgment on the decrease in income tax rate and pension reform 
Against a minimum service in public transport in case of a strike
Against higher penalties for recidivists
Against tougher constraints on the possibil
See themselves as left-wing 
Ready to participate to a demonstration
Voted no to the referendum on the European constitutional treaty (66%) or abstained (14%)
Vote for the first round of the 2002 presidential election: Jospin 34%; Besancenot 18%
Trust in the left wing to govern the country
Negative judgment on privatizations
Positive judgment on the 35-hour week
Prefer the proportional system  
Find the rhythm of the post-2007 reforms too fast
 
 
 
 
 
 
-right scale (histogram). 
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 Figure A8. Self-positioning on a left
Class 9  4.85% 
Workers and foremen 56% 
Most important problems: 1 unemployment; 2 crime
100% think that unemployed could find a job (if they rea
Favourable to an increase in taxes for revenues over 4000 Euros per month (88%)
Favourable to the creation of a ministry for immigration and national identity (82%)
Favourable to a 50% replacement of retiring civil servants 
Positive judgment on CNE 
Vote for the first round of the 2002 presidential election: Chirac 23%, Le Pen 23%; Jospin 19%
Presidential candidate with the best solutions: Sarkozy 32%, 
Favourable to the reinstatement of the death penalty
Find that there are too many immigran
Negative judgment on privatisations
Prefer the proportional system 
Figure A9. Self-positioning on a left
Class 10 3.65% 
Executives and intellectual professions 31%; health and social sector employees 19% 
Parisians 32%; big city dwellers 24%
Most important problems: 1 social inequality; 2 education, youth training
 
-right scale (histogram). 
 
lly wanted to) 
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 Favourable to an increase in taxes for revenues over 4000 Euros per month (86%)
Negative judgment on the decrease in income tax rate and pension reform 
Against a minimum service in public transport in case of a strike
Against higher penalties for recidivists
Against tougher constraints on the possibility for immigrants already in France to bring their family
Ready to participate to a demonstration
Voted no to the referendum on the European constitutional treaty (67%) 
Vote for the first round of the 2002 presidential election: Jospin 26%; Besancenot 24%; Hue 19%
Trust in the left wing to govern the country
Negative judgment on privatizations
Positive judgment on the 35-hour week
Prefer the proportional system  
Find the rhythm of the post-2007 reforms too fast
Figure A10. Self-positioning on a left
Classe 11 3.49% 
Workers and clerks (74%) 
Women (63%) 
Most important problems: 1 unempl
89% think that unemployed could find a job (if they really wanted to)
Favourable to an increase in taxes for revenues over 4000 Euros per month (79%)
Favourable to the creation of a ministry for immigration and national identity 
Favourable to a 50% replacement of retiring civil servants 
Negative judgment on the decrease in income tax rate and pension reform 
Against a minimum service in public transport in case of a strike
Against tougher constraints on the possibility for 
See themselves as left-wing 
There are too many immigrants in France (64%)
Voted no to the referendum on the European constitutional treaty (49%) or abstained (19%)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-right scale (histogram). 
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 Vote for the first round of the 2002 pres
8.6% 
Some risk of being unemployed in the forthcoming months (57%)
Negative judgment on privatizations
Positive judgment on the 35-hour week
Prefer the proportional system 
Figure A11. Self-positioning on a left
Class 12 3.44% 
Workers 52% 
Most important problems: 1 unemployment; 2 immigration
77% think that unemployed could find a job (if they really wanted to)
Favourable to the creation of a ministry for immigra
Favourable to a 50% replacement of retiring civil servants 
Against tougher constraints on the possibility for immigrants already in France to bring their family
See themselves as left-wing 
Voted no to the referendum on the Euro
Vote for the first round of the 2002 presidential election: Chirac 25%; Jospin 23%; Le Pen 18%
Favourable to the reinstatement of the death penalty
There are too many immigrants in France 
Some risk of being unemployed in the forthcoming months 
Negative judgment on privatizations
Positive judgment on the 35-hour week
Prefer the proportional system 
idential election: Jospin 25%; Chirac 18%; Le Pen 11%; Hue 
 
 
 
 
-right scale (histogram). 
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 Figure A12. Self-positioning on a left
 
-right scale (histogram). 
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